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Cultural Differences on Values about Conflict, War and Peace

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This paper shows a strong relationship between national pride and willingness to fight for one's country in the case of war. This relationship is found in countries with great differences in their economic level, in their political systems and in their cultural systems, and it is also very stable over time. From the first comparisons to the last regression models, it has always appeared that national pride is a major predictor of willingness to fight for one's country. However, there is a significant difference between Anglo-Saxon and West European countries in terms of national pride and willingness to defend one's country. Especially more recently established countries and certainly Anglo-Saxon countries show a consistently greater national pride than Western Europe's old nations. An explanation has been suggested: that citizens in Anglo-Saxon countries have not had the experience of fighting wars in their homeland, while West Europeans and Japan have suffered the effects of World War II in their own land, and therefore are less disposed to get involved in conflicts that require fighting. This would probably explain the different attitudes of European and Anglo-Saxon countries towards the recent conflict in Iraq, and it would also explain the mass demonstrations and massive public opinion rejecting participation in that conflict in many European countries, even when their governments had involved themselves in that conflict.

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INTRODUCTION

Theories about social conflict in general (Boulding 1964; Coser 1965; Arendt 1970), and about war and peace in particular (Galtung 1975-80; Huntington 1993; Kelman 1993; Boulding 2000; Christie 2001; Kurtz 2008), have a long tradition in sociological thought. However, comparatively, there has been much less research on individuals' attitudes towards war and peace, probably because both depend much more on governments' decisions than on citizens' attitudes. Very seldom can one find successful examples of the opposite process; that is, public opinion forcing governments to declare war or to make peace. Thus, it is governments (and parliaments) that take decisions to declare war or to make peace, and, consequently, it seems likely that governments will try to secure public opinion support through communication campaigns. Certain very recent events may give support to this assertion. One such event was the trilateral decision (US, UK and Spain) to intervene in Iraq in March 2003, taken by Bush, Blair and Aznar at a meeting on the Azores Islands despite a majority public opinion in Western countries that opposed or did not favor such decision.¹

In general, however, governments are more successful in conveying to their citizens their views on war and peace given that, even in open and democratic societies, they have many possibilities to influence information and communication in the mass media on international relations and events. Therefore, apart from some very salient cases such as the Iraq conflict, people's attitudes towards other countries, as well as towards war and peace, are shaped to a great degree (though not exclusively) by governments' interests. This is one case where centre-periphery theory seems to offer very relevant applications to explain differences in opinions and attitudes between different segments of the population (Galtung 1964; Halle 1966; Díez-Nicolás 1967). According to this theory the social periphery will generally tend to globally support or reject its governments' views on war or peace, while the social centre most likely will show more varied attitudes and opinions, and construct more diverse arguments, to justify or reject war and peace. Since the social periphery is larger than the social centre in all countries,

¹ It would be impossible to give even a summary account of public opinion polls on the decision by the US and its allies to invade Iraq in 2003. For public opinion in the Arab and Middle East countries one can find many results in the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan. In Western countries most international research organizations have data on that conflict regularly. The Eurobarometer has asked about the conflict in Iraq at several occasions, the first one was published in October 2003. The great majority of populations all over the world was against the intervention, except for the US and a few other countries during the first year, though even in those countries public opinion turned critical of the invasion later on.

it seems useful to analyze national (not only elite's) public opinion on these issues in order to infer what the Government's stand on them is. In some cases, there is also the possibility of contrasting public opinion attitudes with those of the government (as shown by their policies and decisions on international relations, and especially on war and peace).

Research findings have shown in many different countries that international affairs and relations are issues in which the citizenry is neither interested nor knowledgeable (Diez-Nicolás 1999). Only events like the Vietnam War, the Palestine-Israel conflict, or the Iraq conflict (especially the one in 2003, but not so much the one in 1991) really catch the attention of the general public. For most other international issues, even those that may relate to war and/or peace, the general public tends to be uninformed, uninterested and consequently tends to lack opinions or attitudes on them.²

The purpose of the present analysis is to explore to what extent there is empirical evidence on citizens' attitudes towards war and peace in different economic, socio-cultural and political settings, so that one can find societal and/or individual characteristics that may explain the variation of attitudes (provided there is such variation). The problem is how to measure and interpret citizens' attitudes. Although values surveys do not provide a direct measurement of attitudes towards war or peace, they do provide some indirect measurements that may be taken as proxies. Thus, an analysis has been carried out based on data gathered through surveys conducted by EVS and WVS in almost one hundred countries and in five waves between 1981 and 2005.³

VALUES ON DEFENCE, NATIONAL SECURITY AND NATIONAL PRIDE IN AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

The present analysis has been based on values data collected at five different points in time (1981, 1990, 1995, 1999-2000, and 2005), so that comparisons have been possible not only cross-culturally, but also over a period of more than twenty five years. The values surveys have included only a few questions that may allow some indirect measurement of attitudes towards war, security, defense or the armed forces. They are the following: 1) willingness to fight for one's country in case of war; 2) confidence in armed forces; 3) aims to have strong armed forces; 4) the good or bad of having military rule;

² Public opinion reports almost unanimously agree that international relations do not catch the attention of the great majority of the population in any society, and only when major events take place they show a very diffuse and general interest.

³ European and World Values Surveys four-wave integrated data file, 1981-2004 (v.20060423, 2006). Surveys designed and executed by the European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association. File Producers: ASEP/JDS, Madrid, Spain and Tilburg University, Tilburg, the Netherlands. File Distributors: ASEP/JDS and GESIS, Cologne, Germany. *WORLD VALUES SURVEY 2005 OFFICIAL DATA FILE v.20081015, 2008. World Values Survey Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). Aggregate File Producer: ASEP/JDS, Madrid.*


and 5) opinion on who should decide on international peacekeeping. It was assumed that national pride should be related to opinions on some of these issues, and therefore the variable measuring national pride was also included in the analysis, mainly as an explanatory variable, together with other independent-explanatory variables.

The main hypotheses tested below are the following: 1) national pride is positively related to willingness to defend one's country in case of war; 2) there are cultural-regional differences regarding attitudes towards defending one's country in case of war that are based on both the public's historical experiences regarding wars and on present perceptions of potential threat from other countries; 3) attitudes towards defending one's country in case of war are very stable over time; 4) attitudes towards defending one's country in case of war are positively related to confidence in the armed forces and to respect for authority, but negatively related to the possibility of military rule; and 5) attitudes towards who should decide on international peacekeeping will vary depending on national pride and other attitudes towards defense and the armed forces.

Previous and more detailed research in Spain provided some background information that proved to be useful in the interpretation of some of the findings (Díez-Nicolás 2006). These data showed that Spaniards evaluate their armed forces very positively, but they strongly oppose having military rule. In the same vein, Spaniards very positively evaluate the new role of their Armed Forces as participants in international peace-keeping abroad, but they oppose very strongly their presence in scenarios that may endanger their troops. It seems appropriate to believe that these apparent contradictions are not exclusive to Spaniards, and could probably be explained in terms of Festinger's dissonance theory (Festinger 1957).

Some of the questions that the present analysis tries to answer are the following: How should we interpret the willingness or unwillingness to fight for one's country: as signs of militarism or anti-militarism, as signs of high or low citizen's consciousness and responsibility, or as signs of braveness or of cowardice? Can we accept that the will to fight for one's country has the same meaning in different cultural contexts? Are there significant cultural-regional differences regarding the willingness to fight for one's country and national pride? Do data support common stereotypes about chauvinism and militarism? Does the willingness to fight for one's country conflict with the perception of the United Nations as the institution that should play the major role in international peace-keeping?

Figure 1. Distribution of Cultural Regions According to the Percentage Willing to Fight for Own Country and Percentage Very Proud of Own Nationality



As a first approach to these questions, the 97 countries for which data are available were divided into 13 groups, defined on the basis of certain cultural and territorial criteria similar to those used in other publications.⁴ Huntington defined seven great cultures or civilizations based mainly on the predominant religion: Confucian-Chinese, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Western, Latin American and African (Huntington 2003). Inglehart also defined eight world cultural regions, mainly based on historical predominant religion: Protestant, Catholic, Islamic, Orthodox, Central Europe, Latin America, Sinic/Confucian and Sub-Sahara Africa (Inglehart 2003), though it is clear that apart from religion he also took into account other cultural and territorial characteristics. Besides, Inglehart's purpose in defining these cultural regions had the purpose of showing that they shared similar values when countries were mapped on a two axis chart, the two

⁴ Countries were grouped in the following cultural-territorial regions: Anglo-Saxon: Australia, Canada, Great Britain, Ireland, New Zealand, North Ireland, USA; West European Catholic: Andorra, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland; West European Protestant: Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Slovakia, Sweden; East European Christian: Czech Rep., Hungary, Poland, Slovenia; European Orthodox: Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Georgia, Greece, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Serbia and Montenegro, Ukraine; Latin American: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Rep., El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, Puerto Rico, Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela; Islamic: Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bosnia, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey; Asian Sino Confucian: China, Hong Kong, S Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam; Japan: Japan; Israel: Israel; Philippines: Philippines; Sub-Saharan: Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, S Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

axes representing traditional vs. secular-rational values and scarcity or survival vs. self-expression values. Díez-Nicolás has slightly modified Inglehart's cultural regions to differentiate Anglo-Saxon from European countries, and treating as mono-countries regions India, Israel, Philippines and Japan, because it seems difficult to include them in other existing cultural regions. Actually, Schwartz also separates Anglo-Saxon and European countries because they are not sharing always the same values (Schwartz 2003). In any case, these classifications are arbitrary as all taxonomies, and respond to some criteria, specified or presupposed. The reasons for using cultural-regions are varied, but one very important is the need to summarize data looking for similarities, though acknowledging the existence of internal differences within each region.

One of the goals of the present analysis is to examine the data at several levels, world or global, cultural-regions, countries, and individuals. A first look at the data shows that the percentage of those willing to fight for their own country varies from 16 per cent in Japan, to 84 percent in the Philippines, while the percentage that feels "very" proud of their own nationality varies from 24 percent in Japan, to 80 percent in the Philippines.

Some countries have participated in all five waves, while others have participated in only one. We base figures on the average of aggregated data from different waves.

The relationship at the cultural-regional level, with only 13 units of analysis, is high ($r = .64$), statistically significant at the .05 level, in spite of the small number of units. This finding confirms the original hypothesis that both variables are positively related, even at this very aggregate (cross-cultural and temporal) level.

It must be underlined that Japan ranks very low on both variables, and that European countries (Catholic, Protestant, Christian and Orthodox) also show lower values in general on both variables than other countries, although there are certainly some exceptions (e.g., Islamic people are relatively less willing to fight for their country than Europeans other than Catholics, and Asian-Sino-Confucian people are less proud of their nationality than East European Christians). In contrast, people in the Philippines, India and Israel seem very willing to defend their country (India is in constant confrontation with Pakistan, and Israel is also in permanent confrontation with its Arabs neighbors). The Philippines, India, Israel, Latin American, Islamic, Anglo-Saxon and Sub-Saharan countries show higher national pride than Europeans.

A first question that emerges is why Europeans in general (and Protestant as well as Catholic European countries in particular) are less willing to fight for their country, and why they show less national pride than do most other countries. The fact that Japan shows the lowest values of them all (and that Germany and other West European Countries show lower values on both variables) suggests perhaps that the outcome of World War II has some relationship with these findings. Thus, a tentative hypothesis is that people in countries that underwent the greatest sufferings of invasion of their homeland and the greatest number of victims (Japan, Germany and other European countries) are also less willing to fight for their country. Suffering an invasion of one's home-

land, destruction of cities, and massive deaths of citizens may remain in people's minds for a life time.

Table 1 shows the average willingness of people to fight for their country and the percentage who feel very proud to be a national of their country for each region, and the average measures (arithmetic mean and standard deviation, on the basis of their respective scales: 1 to 2, and 1 to 4), as well as the correlation coefficient (r) between the two percentages. The regional averages have been calculated taking countries as the units of analysis, but correlation coefficients are not statistically significant in general due to the small number of countries in each region or group of countries. However, the relationship between the two variables is high and statistically significant at the global level, as shown in Figure 1 and as has been mentioned above.

Data presented in Table 1 are also important in that they confirm that, although inter-group differences are generally greater than intra-group differences, intra-group differences are often greater than inter-group differences.

Table 1. Percentage of Willingness to Fight for Own Country (1=no, 2=yes) and National Pride (1=not at all proud, 2=not very, 3=quite, 4=very; Arithmetic Mean and Standard Deviation in the Two Measures, and Pearson's Correlation Coefficient (r) Between the Two Variables, by Cultural Region**)

	Willingness to fight for country			National pride			r^*
	%	\bar{x}	σ	%	\bar{x}	σ	
TOTAL	64	1.73	.17	55	3.41	.26	.64*
Anglo-Saxon	57	1.66	.05	58	3.56	.18	.23
West European Catholic	46	1.56	.12	40	3.26	.24	.56
West European Protestant	64	1.76	.14	37	3.18	.23	.43
East European Christian	66	1.81	.06	51	3.40	.24	-.10
European Orthodox	66	1.78	.07	41	3.19	.23	.30
Latin American	63	1.70	.10	74	3.63	.28	.25
Islamic	76	1.83	.16	67	3.60	.18	-.22
Asian Sinico-Confucian	79	1.84	.15	42	3.23	.48	.67
Japan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hindu	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sub-Saharan	67	1.77	.13	76	3.69	.14	.71*
Israel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Philippines	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
** Measures for the TOTAL have been calculated taking regions as units of analysis. Regional measures have been calculated taking countries as units of analysis.							
* r = Pearson's correlation coefficient. None of the coefficients is statistically significant (due to the small number of countries in each region), except those marked *, significant at the .05 level.							

Standard deviation measures precisely the variation of values among units of analysis around the arithmetic mean. It can be seen that the standard deviation on willingness to

fight for one's country at the global level (taking regions as the units of analysis) is .17, which represents 9.8% of the mean, and is an indicator of differences among regions. The differences among countries within each region (as measured by the standard deviation from the mean for each region) are all smaller. However, with respect to national pride, it can be regarded that intra-group differences for the Latin American group are slightly greater than inter-regional differences, and they are much greater in the case of Asian-Sinico-Confucian countries. Correlation coefficients between willingness to fight for one's country and national pride are high in each region when based on countries as units of analysis, although they are not statistically significant because of the small number of units in each region. However, the opposite is true when individuals are taken as units of analysis. Thus, correlation coefficients are lower, but most of them are statistically significant at the .01 level due to the large number of units (that is, respondents) in each region and country. In fact, the total number of respondents in each country numbers at least 1000. The total number of respondents in all countries and waves is 356,815.

At the individual level it is also evident that intra-group differences are more often larger than inter group differences. Thus, the coefficient of variation (quotient between the standard deviation and the arithmetic mean, as a percentage) among individuals for all countries and waves is 23% in both variables, but it is higher than that among individuals within the Anglo-Saxon, West European Catholic, West European Protestant, Latin American, Japan and Sub-Saharan regions or groups of countries with respect to willingness to fight for one's country. Moreover, with respect to national pride, it is higher than the total inter-group variation (23%) in West European Catholic, West European Protestant, European Orthodox, Asian-Sinico-Confucian regions or groups, and in Japan and Israel. Needless to say, variation among respondents within a particular country is very often greater than variation among respondents within a region or group of countries and among the total number of respondents.

At the individual level, therefore, one can say that there is more homogeneity (fewer differences) regarding the disposition to defend one's country among individuals living in India, the Philippines and Asia-Sinico-Confucian countries, and more differentiation (greater differences) among individuals living in Japan and West European Catholic countries. As for national pride, there is more homogeneity among individuals living in the Philippines, India, and Sub-Saharan, Anglo-Saxon, Latin American, and Islamic countries than in Japan, European Orthodox, and West European Protestant countries.

To summarize these findings, there seems to be enough evidence to conclude that there is a positive relationship between national pride and willingness to fight for one's country, and this relationship holds for the global level, the regional level, the country level and the individual level. The country with the highest percent of individuals who are willing to defend one's country in case of war is Turkey (93%), a fact that seems to be a consequence of the geo-political position of that country in that region, near the conflicts of Iraq and Afghanistan, near the conflicts around the Black Sea between former Soviet-republics, near the potential conflict between the USA and Iran,

and near some of the pipe-lines for oil supply to Europe. Besides Turkey, countries that have more than 80 per cent of their citizens ready to defend it are Azerbaijan, Vietnam, Rwanda, Thailand, Tanzania, Norway, Kyrgyzstan, China, Cyprus, Indonesia, Jordan, Ghana, Philippines, Morocco, Bangladesh and Sweden.

It would be very simplistic to attribute this willingness to fight to violent, aggressive, or imperialistic attitudes. Most countries mentioned above are in geographical areas where conflict has prevailed for decades. Conversely, the country with the lowest percentage of its citizens willing to fight for their country is Japan, followed by Belgium, Iraq, Germany and Italy. Iraq is still experiencing its own internal national conflict, Japan, Germany and Italy were defeated countries in World War II (though Italy changed sides before it ended), and Belgium was one of the West European countries that suffered the German invasion. Most other West European countries show low proportions of their citizens ready to defend their countries, a fact that contrasts with the higher percentages found among Anglo-Saxon countries. As has been mentioned, a tentative hypothesis to explain this very significant difference might be that West European countries suffered World War II in their own land, while Anglo-Saxon countries fought that war not in their land, but in other people's land. The difference between the two groups of countries is evident in Figure 1.

Great differences also appear when considering national pride. The percentage that feels very proud to be a national of one's own country is highest in Ghana (93 per cent), followed by Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, Guatemala, Mali, Puerto Rico, Colombia, El Salvador, Thailand, Pakistan, Burkina Faso and Tanzania (all over 80 per cent). Most of these countries are Latin American, and all are rather new countries that seem to be in need of affirming their national identity. In contrast, the country with the lowest proportion of its citizens feeling very proud of being nationals of their country is Hong Kong (11 per cent), a rather independent city, though not a real country, followed by Taiwan (a country that is very divided between those who want integration with mainland China and those who prefer to remain an independent country), Germany (the great losers of World War II), the Netherlands, Estonia, Japan, Belgium and Moldova (all under 25 per cent).

A second tentative conclusion that may be derived from the data is that willingness to fight for one's country and national pride seems to be very dependent on historical experiences of war situations, but also on the socio-political context in which each country lives.

As willingness to fight for one's country and national pride are the main variables in this analysis, their availability was taken as the main criteria for selecting the countries to be analyzed. Only 32 countries met the requirement of having included the two variables in at least three of the five waves. The analysis has used three different units of analysis: individuals, countries and groups of countries or cultural regions. Cultural regions have been used only for comparing averages on the two main variables (willingness to fight for country, and national pride) regardless of wave, and in that case all 96 countries have been grouped into 13 cultural regions.

PERSISTENCE OF VALUES THROUGH TIME

It is a known fact that values are quite stable over time, while attitudes change more often, and opinions change even in shorter periods of time. The two variables that have been examined may well be classified as belonging to the realm of values, and, consequently, one would expect them to be rather stable. In order to test that hypothesis, only countries that have participated in at least three waves, and have included the two variables under analysis, have been selected. As has already been said, only 32 countries satisfied both conditions, and data are presented in Table 2 by country and wave.

Table 2. % of Respondents Who Would “Fight for One’s Country” and % Who Is “Very Proud” of Nationality, 32 Countries that Included Both Questions in at least Three Waves

	1981		1990		1995		2000		2005	
	Fight	Pride	Fight	Pride	Fight	Pride	Fight	Pride	Fight	Pride
Argentina	45	46	47	53	58	55	54	64	51	59
Australia	69	65			69	69			60	68
Belarus			79	33	74	30	72	24		
Brazil			34	63	70	64			57	39
Bulgaria			77	38	55	46		34	38	40
Canada	57	61	56	59			60	66	53	69
Chile			76	53	69	55	54	72	53	59
China			93	42	89	39	90	25	76	21
Finland			71	37	78	48	82	55	80	55
France	42	28	54	32			49	38	52	28
Germany			34	20	43	12	30	20	28	20
Great Britain	62	51	67	50				45	51	51
India			87	74	82	70	74	67	69	69
Italy	30	38	25	39			52	38	36	41
Japan	20	28	10	27	17	25	16	21	15	21
Lithuania			61	40	51	18	48	20		
Mexico			56	54	56	67	68	79	70	83
Moldova					72	35	21	22	57	19
Netherlands	45	17	61	22				19	36	25
Norway	82	42	85	44	87	50			86	51
Poland			78	63	72	69		69	65	63
Romania			84	48	70	44	71	46	57	37
Russia			68	25	69	29	64	30	61	43
S. Korea	74	44	85	45	82		74	17	72	18
Slovenia			82	54	82	57	75	54	60	55
South Africa			60	63	62	80	56	66	52	76
Spain	53	48	47	43	50	64	37	61	39	58
Sweden	78	28	78	38	85	44		39	80	40

...Table 2 continued.

	1981		1990		1995		2000		2005	
Switzerland			66	36	58	26			52	32
Turkey			90	66	95	76		65	94	76
Ukraine					59	23	54	22	54	27
USA	66	74	70	73	68	78	63	71	63	64

Data seem to confirm that the persistence of a willingness to fight for one's country and for national pride is the rule rather than the exception for the majority of the countries under examination, and especially for those that have participated in five or four waves. It may be concluded that persistence in the two variables is the rule, and significant changes are the exception.

To confirm the high stability or persistence of values regarding the two variables, correlation coefficients have been calculated for each country between the percentage of people willing to fight for their country in every two waves, and the same process has been followed regarding the percentage of who feel "very" proud of being a national of their country. The matrix of correlations is presented in Table 3. Results are very robust in showing very high correlations (almost tautological, if it were not for the fact that individuals answering in each wave are different, and that survey teams in each country and wave are sometimes different too). All correlation coefficients are above .74 and many are higher than .90, and all of them are statistically significant (almost all at the .01 level and only two at the .05 level).

Table 3. Correlation Coefficients (Pearson's r) between % Willing to Fight for Own Country in Every Two Waves, (Five Waves: 1981-2005), and % Who Are Very Proud To Be a National of Their Country in Two Waves, (Five Waves: 1981-2005)

	Fight 81	Fight 90	Fight 95	Fight 00	Fight 05
Fight 81	1	.890(**)	.952(**)	.806(*)	.925(**)
Fight 90	.890(**)	1	.755(**)	.864(**)	.753(**)
Fight 95	.952(**)	.755(**)	1	.912(**)	.879(**)
Fight 00	.806(*)	.864(**)	.912(**)	1	.952(**)
Fight 05	.925(**)	.753(**)	.879(**)	.952(**)	1
	Pride 81	Pride 90	Pride 95	Pride 00	Pride 05
Pride 81	1	.915(**)	.804(*)	.779(**)	.805(**)
Pride 90	.915(**)	1	.869(**)	.794(**)	.741(**)
Pride 95	.804(*)	.869(**)	1	.905(**)	.905(**)
Pride 00	.779(**)	.794(**)	.905(**)	1	.905(**)
Pride 05	.805(**)	.741(**)	.905(**)	.905(**)	1

** Correlation is significant at .01 level (bilateral).

* Correlation is significant at .05 level (bilateral).

Findings are really convincing when one considers the high correlation between results in 1981 and results in 2005 ($r = .92$ and $r = .80$ respectively) for willingness to fight for one's own country and for national pride.

WILLING TO FIGHT FOR OWN COUNTRY, MILITARISM AND DEMOCRACY

Having shown sufficient empirical evidence on the strong relationship between willingness to fight for one's country and national pride, a further step has been taken to inquire about the relationship of these two variables with other variables measuring attitudes towards national defense and armed forces that were mentioned above: greater respect for authority, confidence in the armed forces, preference for type of political system, and importance of democracy.

Table 4. Main Component Analysis to Find Out Dimensions of Militarism

ALL 32 COUNTRIES and WAVES	Component	
	1	2
Confidence: Armed Forces	-.069	.661
National pride	.053	.655
Willingness to fight for country	-.092	.544
Future changes: Greater respect for authority	-.004	.400
Political system: Having a democratic political system	.491	.356
Importance of democracy	.576	.273
Political system: Having experts make decisions	-.580	.152
Political system: Having the army rule	-.629	.292
Political system: Having a strong leader	.726	-.088

A main component analysis based on the nine variables that measure different attitudes towards defense and the armed forces disclosed the existence of two factors. The first factor consists of the four items measuring preference for different types of political system and the item measuring importance of democracy, and consequently it has been labeled as the factor that measures "orientation towards democracy". The second factor includes the other four items, and could be labeled as "orientation towards national defense". It includes confidence in the armed forces, national pride, greater respect for authority in the foreseeable future, and willingness to defend one's country.

In the first factor (see Table 4), one can observe that the main component is positively related to some preference for a "strong leader" as the preferred type of political system, to having a democratic political system, and to considering that democracy is important. That is, individuals who consider democracy important tend to show a preference for democratic political systems and for having a strong leader, but they reject having experts take decisions, and they reject even more having military rule. The items

that are part of the second main component suggest that individuals who have confidence in the armed forces tend to be proud of their nationality, would defend their country if needed, and desire greater respect for authority in the future. It may be interesting to emphasize that, according to these results; preference for having a strong leader is not incompatible with democracy, but quite the opposite.

Taking cultural regions as units of analysis, it is found that Anglo-Saxon, West European Catholic, Latin American and Sub-Saharan countries follow this general pattern, but one may observe different patterns in other cultural regions. All regions agree on having the same four items as part of the "defense" orientation component, although some of them also include some other item from the first component. Thus, East European Christian countries also include in this second component "having experts make decisions", while India, European Orthodox and Asian Sinico-Confucian countries include the two items on democracy (democracy is important, and preference for a democratic political system) as part of the militaristic orientation component. West European Protestant countries and Japan agree on excluding greater respect for authority from the militaristic orientation component, and they include it in the first component (orientation towards democracy), thus making authority compatible with democracy.

The main component analysis suggests that the different variables around war, defense, the armed forces, the different preferences for political system, and similar variables, do have some meaningful latent structures which seem to be arranged around two factors, one stressing values around democracy and the other stressing values around security and patriotism. However, a major difference between cultural regions seems to be the role of respect for authority. In Anglo-Saxon, West European Catholic, Latin American and Sub-Saharan countries, authority is attached to the more "defense oriented", militaristic and patriotic attitudes (confidence in the armed forces, national pride and willingness to fight for one's country). In contrast, in West European Protestant countries and Japan, authority is attached to orientation towards democracy (that is, to considering democracy important, preferring a democratic political system, preferring a strong leader, and rejecting experts and the military as acceptable political systems). For the first group of countries authority seems to be incompatible with democracy, while for the second group of countries authority (and strong leadership) seems to be compatible with democracy.

This finding is interesting because it suggests that historical traditions and experiences in different parts of the world have a significant influence on the role attributed to authority. Some other variations also deserve consideration. For example, India, European Orthodox, and Asian Sino-Confucian countries include the two items on democracy (importance of democracy, and preference for a democratic political system) in the "defense oriented" component, thereby also making authority and democracy compatible. A still different and unique pattern is presented by Islamic countries, as they include (with positive sign) having experts make decisions and having the army rule as part of the "defense oriented" component.

A regression model was constructed with willingness to fight for one's country as the dependent variable, and the other variables mentioned above as independent or explanatory variables: confidence in armed forces, preference for the four types of political system, greater respect for authority in the future, national pride, importance of democracy, cultural region along with a new variable: the percentage wishing that the country has strong defense forces.

Table 5. Regression Model to Explain Willingness to Fight for One's Own Country, All Countries and Waves (Dependent Variable: Willingness to Fight for Country, Omitted Variable: Anglo-Saxon)

R ² = .13	Non standardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Error tip			
(Constant)	.979	.020		49.089	.000
Confidence in armed forces	.065	.002	.131	26.893	.000
Political system may be good:					
Having a strong leader	-.010	.002	-.023	-4.431	.000
Having experts make decisions	-.006	.002	-.013	-2.531	.011
Having the army rule	.015	.002	.033	6.355	.000
Having a democratic political system	.019	.003	.031	6.352	.000
Importance of democracy	.004	.001	.019	3.879	.000
National Pride	.098	.003	.162	33.388	.000
Desired future greater respect for authority	.000	.003	.000	-.071	.943
Aim to have strong armed forces	.043	.004	.047	10.059	.000
West European Catholic	-.047	.010	-.026	-4.735	.000
West European Protestant	.141	.009	.093	15.586	.000
East European Christian	.201	.013	.077	15.220	.000
European Orthodox	.173	.009	.128	20.235	.000
Latin American	.026	.009	.017	2.892	.004
Islamic	.219	.008	.187	26.979	.000
Asian Sinico-Confucian	.270	.008	.206	31.996	.000
Japan	-.257	.020	-.061	-12.715	.000
India	.167	.015	.056	11.365	.000
Sub-Saharan	.136	.008	.115	17.164	.000

Dependent Variable: Willingness to fight for country
Omitted Variable: Anglo-Saxon

The model (Table 5) explains 13 percent of the variance in the dependent variable, but the interesting finding is that all explanatory variables contribute significantly to that explanation when all other variables are being controlled. Only one such variable ("greater respect for authority") does not contribute directly to the explanation of the dependent variable. Nevertheless, two explanatory variables stand over the rest for the

larger part of the dependent variable that they explain: national pride, and confidence in the armed forces. Individuals who feel very proud of their nationality, and those who have greater confidence in the armed forces, are much more inclined to state their willingness to fight for their country. Besides, as Anglo-Saxon countries was the omitted variable in order to use cultural region as one of the variables in the model, it may be confirmed that Anglo-Saxon countries are more willing to defend their country than West European Catholics and more than Japan, but equal or less than all other regions.

When the Islamic countries are omitted from the model instead of Anglo-Saxon countries, results show that they are more willing to fight for their country than all other cultural regions. The new model explains exactly the same 13 per cent of the variance, and all other variables behave exactly as they had done in the previous model. Nevertheless, the difference between Anglo-Saxon countries and Islamic countries suggests the need to calculate a regression model, using the same variables, for each one of the cultural regions. The proportion of the variance explained by each model varies between 4 percent (in India) and 16 percent (in Japan), statistically significant in all cases.

The models have one thing in common: in all of them the two variables that have already been mentioned (national pride and confidence in the armed forces) are the main predictors of willingness to fight for one's country. In addition, other variables contribute significantly to the explanation of the willingness to defend one's country, but in all models the two variables that have been mentioned are the best predictors and the ones that explain a greater proportion of the variance. Japan is, however, the only exception because, showing such a low willingness of its citizens to defend their country, its best predictors are the aim to have strong armed forces and confidence in the armed forces. A second finding common to all regression models is that, in all cultural regions, the relationship of preference for having a strong leader is negatively related to the willingness to fight for one's country, although only in less than half of the cultural regions is it statistically significant.

DECIDING ON INTERNATIONAL PEACE-KEEPING

The values studies include only one question on peace attitudes, a question that inquires about "who should decide on international peacekeeping". Answer categories are: national governments, regional organizations, United Nations, national governments with United Nations coordination, non profit or non government organization, or commercial enterprise. Three different scales have been built in order to use this variable as a continuous variable.⁵ It has been observed that attribution of peacekeeping to the national

⁵ In one scale the categories were: 5=national governments, 4=national governments with UN coordination, 3=United Nations, 2=regional organization, 1=other. A second scales stressed the importance of national governments, with only three categories: 2=national governments, 1=national governments with UN coordination, 0=other. And a third scale

government is positively related (and statistically significant) to considering army rule in certain circumstances, to confidence in the armed forces, to national pride, and to desires of greater respect for authority in the future, but negatively related to importance of democracy. On the contrary, attribution of peacekeeping to the United Nations is inversely related to the same variables. These correlations seem to imply that individuals who attribute to the United Nations the task of international peacekeeping do not have confidence in their country's armed forces, do not show preference for army rule, show no willingness to fight to defend their country, and have low national pride. The reverse is true for those respondents that believe the contrary.

Results also show that more developed countries, mostly European, are more inclined to leave the task of international peacekeeping to the United Nations.

However, the regression models only explain less than 5 per cent of the variance in each scale as dependent variable. The results show that the items selected to measure peacekeeping responsibility should be improved.

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

The evidence presented in this analysis seems to confirm very consistently the high relationship between national pride and willingness to fight for one's country in the case of war. This relationship is found in countries with great differences in their economic level, in their political systems and in their cultural systems, and it is also very stable over time. From the first comparisons to the last regression models, it has always appeared that national pride is a major predictor of willingness to fight for one's country. Certainly other variables are also important, but national pride is, without any doubt, always the best predictor.

It has also been found that respect for authority has different connotations in different cultural settings. In some cultural regions it is associated with democratic attitudes and beliefs, but in others it is associated with an "orientation towards national defense", as measured by confidence in the armed forces, national pride, and willingness to defend the country. This finding is considered important to understand the lack of trust in authority in societies that have had authoritarian regimes, while in long-established democracies authority is easily accepted as a guarantee of the continuation of democracy. There is also a very strong rejection of army rule in all cultural regions, and preference for it is certainly not a significant predictor of willingness to defend one's country.

Another finding that seems well established is that there is a significant difference between Anglo-Saxon and West European countries in terms of national pride and willingness to defend one's country. If the long established stereotype about chauvinism in European countries can be measured by national pride, it is clear that European coun-

stressed the importance of the United Nations also with three categories: 2=United Nations, 1=national governments with UN coordination, and 0=other.

tries are not the most chauvinistic countries in the world. Many others, especially more recently established countries, and certainly Anglo-Saxon countries, show a consistently greater national pride. As for the significant difference between Anglo-Saxon and West European countries (and Japan) regarding the willingness to fight for one's country, an explanation has been suggested that will need to be tested and confirmed through further analysis: that citizens in Anglo-Saxon countries have not had the experience of fighting wars in their homeland, while West Europeans and Japan have suffered the effects of World War II in their own land, and therefore are less disposed to get involved in conflicts that require fighting.⁶ This would probably explain the different attitudes of European and Anglo-Saxon countries towards the recent conflict in Iraq, and it would also explain the mass demonstrations and massive public opinion rejecting participation in that conflict in many European countries, even when their governments had involved themselves in that conflict.

⁶ This tentative hypothesis was already advanced when comparing results for 14 countries in the 1981 wave of values studies (Listhaug 1986). That analysis compared willingness to fight for one's country and fear of war, and it concluded with the finding that the relationship was highly positive.

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