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ВОПРОСЫ ИСТОРИИ, ТЕОРИИ И МЕТОДОЛОГИИ

THE PERCEPTION OF SECURITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE*

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The author considers security a key value in present societies all around the world due to the general change in values since the end of the 20th century, which is characterized by a certain return to more materialistic values and a reduction of personal and economic security under the globalization. The article provides two different but complementary theoretical frameworks for the sociological study of security. The first theoretical frame was developed in the late 1970's as a reaction to the excessive optimism generated by the high levels and rates of economic development during the previous years. Within this conceptual frame the author groups 59 countries into seven geo-cultural world regions, and identifies the change in values not only as a reduction of post-materialist values, but also as an increase in desires for greater authority in the future, particularly in more developed societies. In the second theoretical scheme all forms of social organization (political, economic, family, educational, etc.) including value systems, are instruments of adaptation of human societies to their environment. Thus, the main hypothesis here is that values change because of the levels of security in society, both personal and economic security: as security levels rise or decline, values change. The author considers both theoretically and empirically four indexes of security — personal, community, national and total. According to the European surveys data, developed countries seem to feel subjectively more secure than less developed countries, but variation even among countries within the same world geo-cultural region is very wide. On the basis of three sets of variables used to explain the four indexes of security (socio-demographic, attitudinal, national defence and a combination of the previous three) the author shows that the combined set seems to be the most robust to explain all four indexes of security. However, there is a great variation in the levels of the four types of security among the seven geo-cultural world regions, and among the countries within each region. This implies that the country continues to be the most important unit of analysis in international comparisons, which should take into account both subjective and objective measures of security.

Key words: security; materialistic values; post-materialistic values; geo-cultural world regions; subjective and objective measures of security; indexes of security; personal security; community security; national security; total security.

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SECURITY AS A KEY VALUE IN PRESENT SOCIETIES

Security has always been an important value in traditional societies, but it has become a key value in present societies, both developed and less developed, particularly since the end of the Cold War. During that period most of the literature on security referred to national or state security because of the military (nuclear) equilibrium between the two blocks. But when that period ended, the concept of security has been enlarged to individual, societal, global, human security, as will be briefly discussed below.

As the Human Development Report 1994 [45] points out, the concept of security has been related more to nation-states than to people, while for most people Human Security means being free from the threat of hunger, disease, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression, environmental hazards, etc. However, it also means protection from disruptions of daily life in homes, jobs and communities. For the authors of this report Human Security is a universal concern whose components are interdependent, that is easier ensured through early prevention (through early warning indicators) than to late intervention, and which is people centred. Thus, the concept of security must change from territorial security to people's security, from security based on armaments to security based on sustainable human development. The enlargement of the concept of Human Security must therefore include economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security, to mention only some domains. At present, because of the globalization process, security must also be global, and some of the threats to Global Security are unchecked population growth (world population will double in 50—60 years), disparities in economic opportunities (social and economic inequalities continue to increase, both within and between countries), migration pressures (as recent flows on Europe escaping from hunger-Sub Saharan Africa or from war and political repression-refugees from Syria, Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan), environmental degradation (climate change, melting of the poles), drug trafficking (organized crime, money laundering) or international terrorism (mainly Islamic). The emphasis on Human Security in contrast to state security has become very popular among scholars [1; 43].

The concept of security has changed because of globalization, because of the very important change in the world social environment. First, the city provided security to individuals, later the state provided security to its citizens, but at present, the nation-state is not capable of providing security. That is the reason why most scholars, researchers and politicians are developing interest in other instances that can provide individual and societal security. P. Bilgin [4] has developed the concept of “common security” to imply that security must be sought and maintained not against one's adversaries but with them. This idea is similar to the concept of stable peace developed by J. Galtung [22; 24]. Galtung distinguishes between negative peace (the absence of war) and positive peace (based on the establishment of conditions for social justice), and he also distinguishes between direct violence (physical) and indirect violence (structural and cultural). And K.E. Boulding also advances that stable peace is not based on threat, and prefers the terms global or world security to international security, because the state (the main actor in international politics) is less and less able to provide for security, which leads him to accept the concept of “risk society” proposed by U. Beck

to define present societies. Apart from that, Boulding makes a distinction between developed and less developed societies, so that the later face a “insecurity dilemma”, because they are more preoccupied with internal rather than external security.

Though it is widely accepted to differentiate between national and international security, the fact is that both are very much interrelated, because its relationship is “tightly connected to a political, legal and military framework that should allow for their manifestation without any conflicting standpoints” [32]. And “the notion of borders is fading away and giving rise of the old notion of lines or fronts and regions (NAFTA, Schengenland)” [3], for which reason the concepts of internal and external security are merging into a new one, “field of security”, because both have the same enemy. For Bigo liberty is not the limit of security but the condition of security, so that security has no limits, it is unlimited, it needs to be global.

The idea that internal and external security are not separate, as they were during the Cold War period is present in most works of the post-Cold War period, or at least the emphasis is placed on the idea that they are very interrelated. Nevertheless, though most scholars after the Cold War period emphasize the interdependence between internal and external security, the academic division of labour continues to differentiate them, if only for heuristic purposes. Thus, a very important literature focus on internal security, that deals more with police and similar security forces [2; 5; 20; 39; 41]. The concept of security has not been the exclusive object of experts in international relations and politics, but has also received great attention by social scientists, which precisely have focused on the multiple aspects of security, not only state but also individual and societal security).

Only during the short period between the end of World War II and the fall of the Berlin Wall security was not the main concern of individuals, in particular in more developed societies. This short period is also the period of change from industrial to post-industrial societies, or the change from industrial capitalism to financial capitalism. Two theoretical lines with a more sociological perspective give some new insights to explain why security has become such a key value in present societies.

The first theoretical frame of reference started in the late 70’s, as a reaction to the excessive optimism generated by the high levels and rates of economic development during the previous fifteen years, and its beginning could be placed on the first oil crisis of 1973 and the publication of the first report to the Club of Rome, *Limits to Growth* [38]. Many well known reports at that time described a future following a chain of events that started with (1) an unprecedented rate of world population growth that (2) would impose an accelerated intensive use of world natural resources, especially on energy, that (3) would produce a lower quality of life (in spite of accelerated growth of technology), (4) which would lead to increasing social and economic inequalities between countries and within countries (because those individuals, groups and countries in positions of power would tend to defend and improve their quality of life at the expense of those with less power), that would lead to (5) increasing social conflicts, latent or manifest, between countries and within countries. The corollary of this forecast was that increasing social conflicts would probably lead those in positions of power to recur to

more authority, bringing about more authoritarian (left or right) political regimes, as the most rapid and efficient way to resolve conflicts. This hypothesis, which in great part seems to have been confirmed by facts, especially in recent times, with the financial crisis that started in 2007, is producing high levels of social and economic inequalities, and therefore insecurity in the populations, and thus a new concern for security [10; 17].

In many respects this hypotheses, formulated in the late 1970's, is compatible with Inglehart's theory of value change in modern societies. In fact, Inglehart's theory establishes that values were traditional and materialistic (scarcity, survival values) in traditional pre-industrial societies because people were primarily concerned about their personal and economic security [33]. After World War II, those two sources of insecurity were more or less controlled through the world peace brought by the bi-polar power system of the Cold War and through the welfare state. However, the WVS (1) data from the 2005 and 2010 waves provided evidence for many of the more developed countries suggesting that a change from the new post-materialistic, self-expression or emancipative values that had grown since the end of World War Two till the year 2000 was taking place, a change that implied a certain return to materialistic values and to greater wishes for more authority, because of the growth of personal insecurity (many local wars, the Gulf, the Balkans, international and national terrorism, organized crime, narco-traffic, etc.) and the growth of economic insecurity (unemployment, early retirement, migrations, financial capitalism, globalization, etc.). The growth of insecurity in all realms of life is present in everyday's news programs (food, health, environment, traffic, unemployment, poverty, terrorism, national defence, crime, energy, stock exchanges, etc.), and it is producing a very important change in values, including a higher demand for authority (as observed in the WVS waves of 2005 and 2010), which probably will lead to justify more authoritarian governments even in traditional democracies [14]. The time series from the 1981 to the 2010 waves of WVS shows a significant decline of post-materialist values (2) since 2000, in contrast with previous waves, and a significant growth of the desire for more authority, especially in more developed countries.

Data from the WVS 2010—14 wave confirms the decline in post-materialist values already observed in the 2005 wave. Thus, if we take the nine countries that have participated in the six WVS waves it appears that post-materialist values have increased from 1981 to 2000, with the exceptions of South Africa and South Korea. And if we compare the last three waves, including only the 47 countries that used the post-materialist scale of four items in the last wave (2010—2014), it appears that post-materialist values decreased in 28 countries, increased in 12, and remained more or less the same in 9. The distribution of countries according to their average post-materialism index by wave and geo-cultural region, show that the decrease has been predominant in most regions of the world, regardless of their degree of economic or political development, a change that implies more concern for security and for authority. Nevertheless, some less developed countries still show an increase in their post-materialist values, as they are still going through the process of industrialization and modernization.

Thus, the three Anglo-Saxon countries (3) plus six of the nine European Union countries (Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, Netherlands, Slovenia and Spain) show a reduction

of post-materialist values from 2000 or 2005 to 2010, and only three countries (Poland, Romania and Sweden) still show an increase in post-materialist values. It seems that, with the exception of Sweden, the less developed countries in this group of countries still show some growth of post-materialism, while the more developed countries (especially the three Anglo-Saxon countries plus Germany, Netherlands, Spain and Slovenia) show a decline in these values.

A predominant decrease in post-materialist values is also shown among four of the seven East European and Balkan countries (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan), but they increase in Ukraine, and remain more or less the same in Belarus and Russia. Five out of six countries in the MENA region show a decline in their post-materialist values between 2000 and 2010 (Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, Turkey and Egypt), and only one maintains more or less the same values. There is more contrast in Asia, where four countries show an increase in post-materialist values (Taiwan, India, Pakistan and the Philippines) while four reduce them (China, Japan, Malaysia and Singapore), and two experience no or little change (South Korea and Thailand). Once more, the reduction of post-materialist values seems to be more frequent among the more developed countries. A certain predominance of reduction rather than increase in post-materialist values is evident in Latin America and in Sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, reduction of post-materialism is present in four out of eight countries in Latin America (Argentina, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay), while an increase is shown in three countries (Chile, Colombia and Mexico), and one shows no change (Brazil). Two countries show a decline in post-materialism in Sub-Saharan Africa (Ghana and Rwanda), one shows an increase (South Africa) and another one shows no change (South Africa).

In summary, it can be accepted that a reduction in post-materialist values seems to have occurred in all regions of the world, though more evident in most developed countries, an assertion that implies that the change has been predominant everywhere, while the growth of those values had been also almost universal between 1981 and 2000.

It has been argued that the change of values has implied not only a certain return from more post-materialistic values to more materialistic values, but also a change regarding the desire for "greater respect for authority". It must be remembered that, according to Inglehart, respect for authority and achievement motivation were among the most important values that made possible industrialization and modernization, that is, the passing from traditional to industrial society. On the contrary, the passing from industrial to post-industrial society has been characterized by a great reduction on the importance attached to authority. During the industrialization process authority not only was present in most social institutions (family, religion, education, work, politics, etc.), but they also reinforced each other. However, in the post-industrialization process authority has been contested in all social institutions, while satisfaction of the well-being of the individual has been emphasized. Besides, there is no more reinforcement of authority in the different social domains.

The question that asks the respondent if he/she considers that "more respect for greater authority" in the future is a good thing or a bad thing, has been part of the WVS questionnaire in all six waves. Since the expected change should have started after 2000, only the three last WVS waves have been analyzed. Data in Table 2 shows

that there is still a majority of societies that prefer less authority, but the important thing to underline is that the countries that prefer more authority are mainly the more developed ones.

Thus, the average index in favour of “greater respect for authority” shows that only one of the three Anglo Saxon countries (New Zealand) considers more authority a good thing, while a majority in the other two countries (Australia and the United States) considers it a bad thing. However, five of the eight EU countries consider “more authority” a good thing (Cyprus, Germany, Netherlands, Spain and Sweden), and only two (Estonia and Poland) consider it a bad thing, while one has not a clear opinion (Romania). There seems to be more equilibrium between the two options in East European and Balkan countries, so that while a majority in three countries considers “more authority” a good thing (Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia), other three countries consider it a bad thing (Armenia, Belarus and Ukraine). And the same equilibrium seems to be true of Latin American countries, since three consider “greater authority” a good thing (Chile, Mexico and Uruguay), three consider it a bad thing (Argentina, Peru and Colombia), and one is undecided (Brazil). The opinion that “more authority” is a bad thing prevails in all other regions. Thus, four of the five MENA region countries consider that “more authority” is a bad thing (Algeria, Jordan, Morocco and Turkey), and only one would think it is a good thing (Egypt). In the same line, five out of the eight countries from Asia think that “more authority” is a bad thing (China, India, Pakistan, Singapore and Taiwan), only two (South Korea and Philippines) think it is a good thing, and one is undecided (Japan). Finally, the three countries from Sub-Saharan Africa region consider “more authority” a bad thing (Nigeria, South Africa and Zimbabwe).

In summary, though one can still observe a predominance of the opinion that “greater authority” is a bad thing, it is very clear that this is an opinion that prevails in the less developed countries, while the opinion that it is a good thing seems to prevail in more developed countries, a finding that is coherent with the theory.

Most countries seem to be closer to the post-materialistic pole in the last wave of the WVS, 2010—2014, but only five out of forty seven show an index higher than 2 points (in the scale 1 to 3) and only five show an index lower than 1.5. However, 28 countries show a reduction of the index from the 2000 to the 2010 waves, while only 12 show an increase in post-materialism. This implies that most countries experienced in the past a change towards more post-materialist values, but that there is a trend towards a return to more materialistic values since 2000, a change that seems to be taking place earlier in the most developed countries, though it is being followed by the less developed ones.

Regarding the opinion on the desire for “greater respect for authority” in the future, the data show that most countries have an index over 2 points in the 2010 WVS wave, thus, the opinion that it is a good thing still predominates, and only in four countries the index is below 2 points (Japan, South Korea, Sweden and Taiwan), indicating a certain predominance of the opinion that “greater authority” is a bad thing. But the comparison with the results in the 2000 WVS wave shows that there has been an increase in that opinion in fifteen out of forty countries (most of them more developed countries), while

in twenty two the prevalent opinion is that it is a bad thing, and therefore they would not like "more authority" in the future, an opinion which is characteristic of the post-industrialization process.

If these data are taken as pointing to a trend for the near future, it may be concluded that the trends in both sets of data suggest a reduction of post-materialism in the near future, as well as an increase in desires for "greater respect for authority". More developed countries seem to be the vanguard in both trends, thus confirming also the center-periphery theory [21; 23; 28], in the sense that change of values always starts at the social centre (in this case the more developed countries) and from it is disseminated to the social periphery (the less developed countries).

It seems appropriate to say that the 20th century was characterized by the confrontation of two very important values: Freedom vs. Equality, but the 21st century will be characterized by the confrontation between two other values: Freedom vs. Security, so that the problem will be to know how much freedom societies are ready to give up in order to guarantee a certain level of security. It is not a coincidence that Security has become the fastest growing business in the world today, and not only because of the arms race, but because of the industry of security in all realms of our life (food, health, energy, economy, justice, finance, crime, national defence, etc.).

As a provisional corollary, and drawing still on another theoretical scheme (social ecosystem theory [29; 30], all forms of social organization (political, economic, family, educational, etc.) including value systems, are instruments of adaptation of human societies to their environment, and together with technology, they constitute the peculiar and unique way that human societies use to survive in their environment (non-material and material culture), contrary to plants and animals, whose adaptation is always mechanic, given by genetic heredity. Technology, especially innovations in communication and transportation would be the main producers of change, because of their effects in expanding the environment (from the nomads' sustenance economy to the present globalization of the economy) were men find their resources, and consequently producing change in the material and non-material culture, especially in the forms of social organizations.

Human history demonstrates that the interaction between population and environment, through the intervening effect of technology, mainly communication and transportation technology, have affected the responses produced by societies through changes in the social organization (economic, political, educational, familial, etc.) and values systems. This suggests that maybe we are at the point of a great change that may affect the present model of economic organization (capitalism, and especially financial capitalism) and the present model of political organization (parliamentary democracy). Not having a crystal ball it is difficult to predict what will be the new models, though it is well known that through human history these two models have changed many times, and that it would be very unusual that they will perpetuate forever when the other three elements of the social ecosystem have changed so much in the past decades (population, environment and technology). Therefore, present insecurity might also be a result of the objective and subjective perception that the two main social organizations: the economy and the polity are changing dramatically, without our knowing where

the world is heading to. It is quite obvious that peoples that lived through the Industrialization or the Enlightenment were not conscious that they were living such huge societal changes [16].

The main hypothesis sustained here is that values change because of the levels of security in society, both personal and economic security. Thus, following Inglehart, there was a change in attaining higher security levels after the end of World War II. But as security levels declined more recently, values are changing again, and the data of WVS-2005 and even more those of WVS-2010 seem to provide evidence of this new change, actually a reversal towards less post-materialist values and greater desire for authority.

However, it seems necessary to argue why the former security levels have declined since, more or less, the beginning of the 21st century. Power exists and is a necessary function in all societies. One can distinguish between economic power, that regulates the production and distribution of resources, and political power, that regulates social relations through normative systems. Through human history, these two powers have cooperated or, at times, have confronted each other. In any case, both powers have adopted a multiplicity of forms to adapt to societal changes. Very recently, however, one has witnessed more and more clearly a differentiation between financial and economic powers. During industrial capitalism economic power (that is, firms, companies) had control over banks (the financial power), but as financial capitalism has grown, financial power has acquired the control of economic power. Globalization has favoured the growth of financial power, because it is not real but virtual, and because it has no need to be attached to a territory, and therefore linked to any political power (which is generally linked to a territory). Financial power is therefore much more free from the power of any polity; it is in fact the only globalized power, while economic power is more linked to a territory, and therefore more subject to a political organization, to a particular government. While financial power is globalized, political power is fragmented into more than 200 so called, "sovereign states" [13]. The present situation may be characterized by a more or less open confrontation between financial power and political power to decide who controls who, and the confrontation seems to have one winner. But why should this process have an effect on the security of individuals and societies?

The logic of financial power, because it is globalized, is to maximize benefits. To that effect, the world is a closed system. Before globalization, there were a variety of interacting systems, but after globalization the world is more and more only one system. Globalization means, among many other things, that the two separate parts that were different, as they merge into one single whole, will eliminate or reduce differences between them. Two processes have followed the logic of financial power: industrial relocation and immigration. Through the first process, industries have been relocated to territories where labour was cheaper. The process has been advantageous to the receiving territory, but negative to the sending territory, because it creates jobs in the former while it destroys them in the one that loses industries. Those who suffer, mainly in the developed countries, are the workers, but there are also some gains for

the less developed territory. A similar pattern describes the effects of migration flows. Immigrants, in a large proportion without documentation, cannot have legal contracts, and even if they do, they get lower wages than local workers. Unemployment among the population of the more developed countries usually characterizes both processes, and as a result, a reduction of economic security for the middle and working classes in those countries, and larger benefits for investors and financial power in general, because of cheaper labour costs.

In addition, it is possible to argue that, during the Cold War years, after World War II, the “free market economy world” had to distribute national resources in a more equitable way in order to avoid the “proletarian revolution” that was being exported and supported (even through the threat of nuclear missiles) from the “state planned economy world”. That took place especially during the decades of the 1960’s and 1970’s, and one of its main consequences was the consumption revolution, the expansion of the welfare state, and the enlargement of middle classes and, consequently, the reduction of economic and social differences in the more developed world. However, once the German Wall fell down in 1989, the fear for the “exported proletarian revolution” was very much reduced, for which reason financial capitalism was not forced any more to distribute resources better. Domestic anti-system movements are much more local and do not have the support of one of the two world powers. And economic and social differences began to increase since the 90’s, until the present situation after the financial crisis of 2007. As social and economic differences continue to increase, insecurity, both personal and economic, also increases, social welfare benefits have been reduced everywhere, and the middle classes are the ones paying the highest price. However, if security decreases, values will also change, and social conflicts will increase [19].

It seems clear, on the basis of the data already examined, that values are changing, especially in the more developed societies, towards a more materialistic and authoritarian orientation, because of increasing insecurity. That is why it is necessary to have a well grounded measure of perceived (subjective) security that will allow observing the evolution of that important and decisive sentiment in future years.

MEASURING THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY

The above reflections, which I have developed in several publications since more than a decade ago, are the basis for the theoretical scheme that I have developed to do research on Security (4):

INTERNAL SECURITY	EXTERNAL SECURITY	
	OBJECTIVE	SUBJECTIVE
OBJECTIVE		
SUBJECTIVE		

Thus, a first research in 2007 with a national representative sample of 1,200 face-to-face interviews in Spain allowed the construction of a Synthetic Index of Subjective Security, covering internal and external security [15]. The concept of Subjective

Security was first defined through an item measuring R's General Self-evaluation of their Personal Security which was used as a referent, and then 17 different dimensions of security were explored to examine which ones seemed to best explain R's self evaluation. The 17 dimensions were: 1) general satisfaction with life in general, 2) self-evaluation of health status, 3) perception of changes in general self-evaluation of personal security with respect to 10 years before, and the following indexes: 4) affective security, 5) neighbourhood security, 6) perception of problems in the neighbourhood, 7) daily fears and threats, 8) worries on health and integrity, 9) worries on external and environmental conditions, 10) personal precautions, 11) automobile precautions, 12) household precautions, 13) access to weapons, 14) personal-family economic worries, 15) personal-social economic worries, 16) external-international threats, and 17) personal experience of victimization. Each of these dimensions was measured through several items or indicators, which were combined to construct an index after statistical analysis of the indicators for each dimension: frequency distributions, correlation matrix of indicators, main component analysis and final construction of the index. The total number of items to construct the indexes was 70. A similar process was followed with the 17 constructed indexes plus R's General Self-evaluation of their Personal Security, finalizing with a main component analysis that is presented below.

Table 1

**Main component analysis of indexes of different dimensions of security,
Spain 2007 [15]**

	Components					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. R's General Self-evaluation of Personal Security	.626	-.018	.194	.235	.313	.021
2. General satisfaction with life in general	.057	-.121	.437	-.060	.561	.238
3. Self-evaluation of health status	-.090	-.089	.700	.178	.091	.108
4. Perception of changes in personal security with respect to 10 years before	.248	.408	.110	.437	.251	.106
5. Affective security	.098	.103	.707	.005	-.152	-.313
6. Neighbourhood security	.722	-.280	-.055	.061	.254	-.073
7. Problems in the neighbourhood	.842	-.209	-.094	.051	.051	-.046
8. Daily fears and threats	.828	-.169	.065	.066	-.089	-.075
9. Worries on health and integrity	-.236	.786	-.140	-.031	.059	-.032
10. Worries on external and environmental conditions	-.261	.789	-.050	.064	-.037	-.008
11. Personal precautions	-.086	.060	-.175	-.813	.097	-.080
12. Automobile precautions	.023	.238	.377	-.430	-.116	.168
13. Household precautions	-.062	.020	-.037	.017	-.104	.898
14. Access to weapons	-.515	-.029	-.028	.409	-.016	-.188
15. Personal-family economic worries	-.266	.703	.332	-.097	.097	-.032
16. Personal-social economic worries	-.535	.302	.103	.084	.235	.034
17. External-international threats	-.075	.758	-.003	-.107	-.142	.046
18. Personal experience of victimization	-.072	-.036	.193	-.008	-.728	.255

Method of extraction: Main component analysis
 Rotation method: Normalization Varimax with Kaiser
 Rotation converged in 14 iterations

This analysis made it very clear that three indexes were really related to R's General Self-evaluation of Personal Security: the perception of security in the neighbourhood of residence, the problems perceived in the neighbourhood, and the daily personal fears and threats perceived by R. A correlation matrix confirmed that the highest correlation coefficients were those between R's general self-evaluation and the three cited indexes (all above .40 and statistically significant at .01 level). The correlation coefficients among the three indexes were high but not tautological (between .50 and .70).

The decision was taken to construct an Index of Subjective Security based on these three indexes. In fact, since each index was the product of a combination of different items or indicators, several indexes were constructed on the basis of different criteria that used different items or indicators from each dimension-index. Thus, to test the real validity of the analysis, a total of six indexes were constructed: Security-Index-1 was built using the two indicators with the lower correlation coefficient between them from each one of the three dimensions, in order to obtain the least overlapping possible. It combined, then, six such indicators. Security-Index-2 was constructed on the basis of the two indicators with the higher and lower saturation values on the main components analysis for each dimension-index; once more the index included six such indicators. Security-Index-3 was constructed adding the values of all indicators in each of the three dimensions, aggregating them in one index at the end. Security-Index-4 was constructed adding the values of all indicators in each of the three dimensions, aggregating besides the values of all indicators in two more dimensions: affective security and worries on health and integrity. Insecurity-Index-1 was constructed adding the standardized values of all indicators in the three dimensions that have been used in most indexes: neighbourhood security, neighbourhood problems and daily fears. Insecurity-Index-2 was constructed adding the standardized values of all indicators in the three dimensions mentioned plus the sum of the standardized values of all indicators in five other dimensions: worries on health and integrity, worries on external and environmental conditions, personal-family economic worries, personal-social economic worries, and external-international threats.

Table 2

Correlation coefficients * (Pearson's r) between security indicators among them and with R's general self-evaluation of personal security, Spain 2007 [15]

	R's General Self-evaluation of Personal Security	SEC1	SEC2	SEC3	SEC4	INSEC1	INSEC2
R's General Self-evaluation of Personal Security	1	.45	.48	.49	.47	-.49	-.38
SECURITY 1	.45	1	.92	.94	.92	-.94	-.78
SECURITY 2	.48	.92	1	.93	.90	-.94	-.76
SECURITY 3	.49	.94	.93	1	.96	-1.00	-.81
SECURITY 4	.47	.92	.90	.96	1	-.96	-.88
IN SECURITY 1	-.49	-.94	-.94	-1.00	-.96	1	.81
IN SECURITY 2	-.38	-.78	-.76	-.81	-.88	.81	1

* All correlation coefficients are significant at .01 level.

The most interesting finding is that all six indexes, in spite of the great variation in their construction, seem to have a very similar relationship with R's general self-evaluation of personal security. Only Insecurity-2 shows a correlation coefficient slightly below .40. Furthermore, the correlation coefficients between each one of the six indexes and the other five are generally above .90. The interpretation seems to be that no matter what items or indicators are selected from the three main dimensions (Security Indexes 1, 2 and 3), their relationship with R's general self-evaluation of personal security is practically the same, or expressed differently, that the indicators used to measure each dimension are interchangeable. This finding is very important in the sense that what really matters is the dimensions, rather than the specific items-indicators used to measure each dimension. The total number of items or indicators that were used to measure the three basic dimensions mentioned above is only 25. This feature facilitates validation of the Subjective Security Index in different cultures, because it allows selection of 6 of them among a total of 25, but always taking 2 items-indicators from each one of the three dimensions. An additional validation of these findings was made through a main component analysis of the 25 items-indicators, which produced three components, each one of them including precisely the items-indicators that were used to measure each dimension.

To complete this analysis, several regression models were constructed, using different groups of potential micro- explanatory/independent variables: socio-demographic, social status, attitudinal/ideological, territorial, as well as social-economic structure macro- explanatory/independent variables, to explain the Subjective Security Index as dependent variable. The final regression model adopted used a total of 13 independent explanatory variables including: size of place of residence, post-materialism-4 index, victimization index, four different measures of occupational structure and unemployment, and six indexes of dimensions different from the three that were used to calculate Security 1, 2 and 3. This regression model, that used variables not included at all for the construction of the three cited Indexes of Security, explained 55% of the variance in each of the three Subjective Security Indexes (1, 2 and 3). Most explanatory contributions were significant at the .01 level, and all of them were significant at the .05 level.

Finally, the Subjective Security Indexes were used as predictors, as explanatory/independent variables in regression models to explain variation in several dependent variables, like general satisfaction with life, worries about health, environmental worries, personal worries, access to weapons, personal-family worries and personal-social worries, jointly with other independent variables: socio-demographic, social status, attitudinal/ideological, territorial, as well as social-economic structure macro- explanatory/independent variables. In all cases, the Subjective Security Index was the best predictor of the dependent variable.

VALIDATION OF THE SUBJECTIVE SECURITY INDEX

In 2008, a second survey was conducted in Madrid, based on a sample of 8,600 individuals, to allow territorial comparisons in the 21 city districts. Both the questionnaire

and the methodology were similar to the ones used for the survey in Spain. Thus, every single methodological step was replicated, in many cases separately for each one of the 21 city districts. And the results were practically the same, with small and not significant differences in some district because of its population composition. Besides, however, and due to the opportunity to have city districts, one more dimension was added: perceived dangers in the district, for which 13 items/indicators were used. A main component analysis showed the existence of two different components, one measuring serious dangers, and the second measuring light dangers. This new dimension seemed to contribute to refine the construction of the Subjective Security Index.

The main conclusions derived from the two independent surveys in Spain and Madrid may be summarized as follows:

- (1) The validity and reliability of the Subjective Security Index was demonstrated, even with different alternatives for its construction on the basis of different items/indicators, provided they belong to the three dimensions mentioned in the above discussion.
- (2) The relationship between any of the SS's and R's general self-evaluation of personal security is strong in both surveys, a finding that seems to demonstrate that an individual's feeling of personal security depends mainly from three sets of factors, their perception of neighbourhood security, their perception of neighbourhood problems, and their daily fears and perception of threats. The survey in Madrid also added the perception of dangers, serious and/or light.
- (3) Individual micro-variables, socio-demographic or attitudinal, explain very little of the variation in SSI's.
- (4) On the contrary, contextual macro-variables do have a much greater predictive power to explain variation in SSI's, both in Spain and in Madrid.
- (5) To live in one region of Spain or another does not have any explanatory power in the SSI's, but to live in one city district or another does have a great explanatory power, a finding that suggests that it is the more immediate social environment, the neighbourhood and not the wider community (the region) that really has importance on individuals' perception of personal security or insecurity.

The 2010 WVS wave gave the opportunity to validate the Subjective Security Index just described by accepting to include a new battery of questions that, for the most part, replicated items from the Spanish battery, though it introduced a couple of new items. However, as has been explained and demonstrated, the SSI can accept many different items provided they measure the same dimensions. The questions included in the 2010 WVS questionnaire were the following:

V165. Could you tell me how secure do you feel these days in your neighbourhood?

Very secure	1
Quite secure	2
Not very secure	3
Not at all secure	4
DK/NA	-1

V166. How frequently do the following things occur in your neighbourhood?

	Very	Quite	Not frequently	Not at all frequently	DK/NA
V167. Robberies	1	2	3	4	-1
V168. Alcohol consumption in the streets	1	2	3	4	-1
V169. Police or military interfere with people's private life	1	2	3	4	-1
V170. Racist behaviour	1	2	3	4	-1
V171. Drug sale in streets	1	2	3	4	-1

Which of the following things have you done for reasons of security?
(multiple response)

	Yes	No
V172. Didn't carry much money	1	5
V173. Preferred not to go out at night	1	5
V174. Carried a knife, gun or other weapon	1	5

V175. Have you been the victim of a crime during the past year?

V176. And what about your immediate family — has someone in your family been the victim of a crime during the last year?

	V175. Respondent	V176. Family
Yes	1	1
No	5	5
DK/NA	-1	-1

To what degree are you worried about the following situations?

	Very much	A good deal	Not much	Not at all	DK/NA
V177. Losing my job or not finding a job	1	2	3	4	-1
V178. Not being able to give my children a good education	1	2	3	4	-1
V179. A war involving my country	1	2	3	4	-1
V180. A terrorist attack	1	2	3	4	-1
V181. A civil war	1	2	3	4	-1
V182. Government wiretapping or reading my mail or email	1	2	3	4	-1

Following the methodology of the Spanish surveys, a main component analysis has been produced with all the items that derived from the questions mentioned above. The results of this main component analysis, allowing for free number of components, were very similar to those found in Spain. The first factor showed three items with saturations over .8 (war involving my country, terrorist attack and civil war), all of them related to national security, plus one other item more or less related to national security (government wire-tapping) with lower saturation (.67), and two items that really refer to personal security (losing my job and not being able to give one's children a good education). But two of these three items had saturations over .6 and only one over .7, high but not as high as the three related to national security. The second factor included the five items measuring things that happened usually in their neighborhood, all with saturations over .7. The third factor included two items measuring personal security: not carrying much money when going out, and not going out at night, with saturations over .8. The fourth factor included three items, one related to personal security (carrying

weapons for reasons of security) and two measuring being the victim of a crime (respondent or family member), both of which showed saturations over .7. These results seem to suggest that respondents clearly differentiate three levels of security: personal (that includes both the respondent and closest relatives), community (basically the neighborhood or town of residence), and national (relative to national defense and security, threats from outside the country, etc.). Thus, a new main component analysis was computed asking for only three factors.

The main difference between the two main component analyses is that three items do not seem to belong to any of the three components: carrying a weapon, and respondent or relative being the victim of a crime. As was already noticed in the analysis of the surveys in Spain, and is now confirmed with the WVS data, only a very small proportion of the sample (more than 85,000 respondents in 59 countries) answers that, for reason of security they carry a weapon (6%), or that respondent (8%) or some family member (11%) have been the victim of a crime. Nevertheless, in spite of its very small frequency, but because carrying a weapon measures a great level of insecurity, we have kept this item for the construction of the Personal Security Index (PSI), as will be explained later.

The three levels of security were therefore differentiated: personal, community and national. The five items related to the neighborhood had similar saturation values and were components of the second factor. The two items related to personal security had similar saturation values and were the components of the third factor. However, the first factor included not only the four items measuring national security, but also two factors that measured personal security. The explanation seems to be that all six items had similar question wording, all of them starting with “how worried are you about...”. This would be an example of “halo effect”, in the sense that respondents probably gave a similar answer to all of them. Nevertheless, the three items more clearly related to national security show saturation values above .7, while the others are only slightly over .6.

Table 3

Main component analysis of indexes of different indicators of security (WVS-2010, 59 countries), 3 components

	Component		
	1	2	3
Secure in neighbourhood	-.024	-.461	-.320
How frequently do the following things occur in your neighborhood:			
Robberies	.082	.749	.129
Alcohol consumed in the streets	.097	.711	.139
Police or military interfere with people's private life	.067	.708	-.043
Racist behavior	.050	.713	-.050
Drug sale in streets	.069	.768	.086
Things done for reasons of security:			
Didn't carry much money	.048	.021	.817
Preferred not to go out at night	.126	.022	.790
Carried a knife, gun or other weapon	.013	.178	.207
Respondent was victim of a crime during the past year	-.005	.309	.273
Respondent's family was victim of a crime during last year	.002	.321	.286

End of Table 3

	Component		
	1	2	3
Worries:			
Losing my job or not finding a job	.669	.120	.061
Not being able to give one's children a good education	.726	.087	.077
A war involving my country	.878	-.002	.034
A terrorist attack	.876	-.001	.040
A civil war	.882	.030	.028
Government wire-tapping or reading my mail or email	.674	.091	.009

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization
 Rotation converged in 5 iterations

In order to gain a better knowledge of the different indicators in relation to the general feeling of security, a new main components analysis was calculated fixing only one component, so that items would scale themselves on the basis of their saturation levels. This new analysis demonstrated that the higher saturations were obtained with the six indicators of worries, those related to national security leading the scale, followed immediately by personal worries. Lower in the scale are the indicators related to neighbourhood problems, still with medium saturation levels, and even lower one finds the indicators of things done because of security, the two indicators of victimization, and the item on carrying weapons closing the scale.

After several statistical analyses it was decided to construct an index of perception of security for each one of the three dimensions, plus a fourth one that would summarize the previous three, with the fewer number of items that would combine the different dimensions of security, and would avoid as much as possible unnecessary redundancies. Four indexes were therefore constructed, based on the following individual items/indicators:

- ◆ Personal Security Index (PSI): Preferred not to go out at night, Didn't carry much money, Carried a knife, gun or other weapon.
- ◆ Community Security Index (CSI): Drug sale in the streets, Robberies, Alcohol consumption in the streets.
- ◆ National Security Index (NSI): Worry about international war, Worry about terrorist attack, Worry about civil war.
- ◆ Total Security Index (TSI): Sum of Indexes of Personal (PSI), Community (CSI) and National (NSI) Security.

Each index (PSI, CSI and NSI) can vary between 3 and 12 points in the scale, where 3 = low security and 12 = high security. Therefore, the TSI scale can vary between 9 and 36 points.

The feeling of security in the neighbourhood is significantly and positively related to the Total Security Index and its three component indexes, but especially to the Community Security Index, while the lowest relationship seems to be with the National Security

rity Index. This was due to the wording of the question, slightly different in the WVS questionnaire. Thus, in the Spanish questionnaires the question asked for perception of security in general in the city or town of residence, and in the neighbourhood, so that an index was constructed by aggregation of the two, while in the WVS question there is an explicit focus on perception of security in the neighbourhood. As expected, the Total Security Index shows the strongest relationships with other three indexes, since it was constructed by aggregation of the other three.

Table 4

Correlation matrix of the feeling of security in the neighbourhood and the four constructed indexes of security (WVS-2010, 59 countries)

	Secure in neighbourhood	PSI	CSI	NSI	TSI
Secure in neighbourhood	1	.209**	.412**	.067**	.319**
PSI	.209**	1	.210**	.106**	.657**
CSI	.412**	.210**	1	.111**	.612**
NSI	.067**	.106**	.111**	1	.690**
TSI	.319**	.657**	.612**	.690**	1

* All correlation coefficients are significant at .01 level.

The comparison of the perception of security in the neighbourhood from the aggregate data in the 2010 WVS wave with the Spanish data, based almost completely in the same items/questions, suggests that security in most countries is mainly based on the experiences of security in the neighbourhood, in the relatively small space in which people develop their daily life. The data from a great number of countries discriminates the three levels of security more clearly, but confirms that Community Security seems to have a greater weight on the feeling of security of individuals than the perception of personal security, and even more than national security.

One of the main differences in the composition of the four Security indexes using the WVS data, in comparison with the Spanish data, has been the inclusion of “carrying a knife or a weapon” for constructing the Personal Security Index (PSI). We decided to include it as one of the three items precisely because it is an extreme measure of personal insecurity. A person carrying a weapon certainly feels insecure. Besides, the two other items measuring personal security (losing job and children’s education) probably suffered the halo effect, as has been suggested, because of being in the same battery together with items measuring national security. Regional differences regarding the frequency of “carrying a knife, gun or other weapon for reasons of security” are very large, so that the largest percentage is observed in Anglo Saxon countries (8.6%), followed by MENA region countries (8.1%) and Sub Saharan African countries (8.0%), while the proportion is lower in Asia (7.4%) and East Europe and Balkan (4.0%), and much lower in European Union countries (2.6%).

Table 5

Means and standard deviations in the four standardized indexes of security for the total sample and the geo-cultural regions (WVS-2010, 59 countries)

	CULTURAL REGIONS 1							
	Personal Security	Community Security	National Security	Total Security	PSI	CSI	NSI	TSI
TOTAL SAMPLE 59	8.7	9.5	6.5	24.7	2.7	2.4	3.2	5.5
Anglo Saxon	9.2	9.8	8.4	27.4	2.7	2.0	2.5	5.0
European Union	9.1	10.4	8.4	28.0	2.4	1.8	3.0	4.5
East Europe & Balkans	8.1	9.8	6.0	24.1	2.5	2.2	2.8	4.8
MENA	9.5	9.6	5.5	24.4	2.8	2.5	2.9	5.5
Asia	8.1	10.1	6.4	24.7	2.7	2.0	2.9	5.2
Latin America	8.1	7.9	6.4	22.3	2.6	2.6	3.4	5.6
Sub Saharan Africa	8.8	8.6	5.8	23.2	2.9	2.5	3.2	5.2

It may be seen that the perception of security in the Community is higher than the other two indexes in the total aggregate sample, and in the seven geo-cultural regions that have been defined for this analysis (with the exceptions of Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, where Personal security is higher than Community security). The perception of National security is significantly lower than Personal security for the total sample and for the seven regions. The variance among regions is not large regarding Personal and Community security, but it is much higher regarding National security. Data suggests that the perception of Total security is higher in European Union and Anglo Saxon countries, and it seems to decline respectively in Asia, MENA, East Europe and the Balkans, Latin America and Sub Saharan African countries. But this rank-order is different for each of the measures of perceived security. Thus, Anglo Saxon countries show higher Personal security than European Union countries, though MENA countries rank a little higher than both; and Sub-Saharan countries show higher Personal security than the other three regions. With respect to perceived security in the Community, European Union and Asian countries rank significantly higher than Anglo Saxon and East European and Balkan countries, while countries in Sub Saharan Africa and Latin America seem to perceive the lowest Community security. And, regarding the perception of National security, European Union and Anglo Saxon countries have higher perceptions than the rest, but Sub Saharan African and MENA countries show the lower perceptions of National security. The values of the different standard deviations are not high in any case, and very similar in all cases.

SECURITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

In Table 6, countries have been rank-ordered in each of the four indexes of security. Some countries have been omitted because they did not ask some of the items that were necessary to construct some of the four indexes. In most countries, Community security is higher than Personal or National security, but only in two countries perceived National security seems to be higher than the other two indexes: Argentina and Sweden.

And in 17 countries Personal security is the highest perceived security: Algeria, Australia, Brazil, Ecuador, Palestine, Ghana, Jordan, Lebanon, Mexico, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, South Africa, Spain, Tunisia, Egypt and Uruguay. It is impossible to make an interpretation of each individual country in this paper, something that would require, in addition to other facts, taking into consideration the socio-economic-political context at the time when data were collected in each particular country. Nevertheless, it seems that the analysis by geo-cultural regions gives some good insight that in general is supported by individual country data.

With respect to Personal Security, it must be underlined that among the ten countries that have the highest PSI six are from the MENA region, two from Sub-Saharan Africa, one from Asia and the other one from the European Union. This fact suggests that either the less developed countries enjoy higher day to day security, or that they are used to a high insecurity and therefore are not conscious of it. When we conduct an analysis of Objective Security based on statistical indicators (i.e., crime rates, etc.) it will be possible to find out the explanation. It is not surprising, on the other hand, to see that Mexico and Brazil occupy ranks 53 and 52 out of 59 countries regarding Personal Security, when one takes into account the news about violent deaths and all kinds of violence affecting the population at large in those two countries. The same seems to be the case also in China, Pakistan, Malaysia and Thailand, for different reasons (political unrest and demonstrations, etc.). The data also suggest a great deal of variation among countries within each geo-cultural world region. Thus, it is remarkable the great difference observed between Spain (rank 3) and The Netherlands (rank 42) in subjective Personal Security. One may ask whether the differences are real or they depend on the levels of insecurity that individuals in the two countries are ready to accept in order to consider themselves secure or insecure. This is always the problem with subjective indicators, and that is also the reason why the two levels of security, subjective and objective, must be investigated and compared.

Brazil and Mexico are again the two countries where perceived Security in the Community is lowest; they occupy the last two positions in the ranking, followed by South Africa, Ecuador and Egypt. It is certainly noteworthy that eight Latin American countries are among the fifteen with the lowest perceived security in the Community. And it is also not surprising that Anglo Saxon and European Union countries are among the countries with higher perceived National and Defence Security, while less developed countries constitute the majority of countries at the bottom of the ranking, showing low perceived National and Defence security. Once more, the comparison between objective and subjective security regarding National and Defence security will be most interesting and illustrative.

Finally, since the Total Index of Security has been computed by aggregation of the other three, it reflects the combined effect of the three indicators. The top countries in the ranking are mainly countries from the more developed regions (Anglo Saxon and European Union), while the bottom of the ranking includes most of the less developed countries, though, as already said, there are great differences among countries within each world geo-cultural region (i. e., Singapore vs. Malaysia and Philippines in Asia).

Table 6

**Ranking of countries according to the four standardized indexes of security
(WVS-2010, 59 countries) (5)**

Rank	PERSONAL SECURITY		COMMUNITY SECURITY		NATIONAL SECURITY		TOTAL SECURITY	
	Country	Index	Country	Index	Country	Index	Country	Index
1	Qatar	11,3	Uzbekistan	11,2	Netherlands	10,3	Sweden	29,5
2	Jordan	10,9	China	11,1	Sweden	10,2	Germany	29,4
3	Spain	10,6	Azerbaijan	11,1	New Zealand	9,4	Singapore	29,1
4	Palestine	10,4	Singapore	11,0	Germany	9,1	Netherlands	28,8
5	Yemen	10,4	Slovenia	11,0	Argentina	8,9	Slovenia	28,4
6	Tunisia	10,4	Yemen	10,9	Australia	8,7	New Zealand	28,4
7	Rwanda	10,3	Japan	10,9	Slovenia	8,5	Australia	28,3
8	Kuwait	10,2	Cyprus	10,8	Hong Kong	8,4	Uzbekistan	28,0
9	Ghana	10,1	Germany	10,8	Uzbekistan	8,1	Spain	28,0
10	Singapore	9,9	Armenia	10,7	Chile	8,1	Jordan	28,0
11	Cyprus	9,9	Netherlands	10,6	Singapore	8,0	Cyprus	28,0
12	Australia	9,8	Taiwan	10,6	Trinidad & Tobago	7,9	Palestine	27,6
13	Armenia	9,8	Turkey	10,5	United States	7,9	Romania	26,7
14	Romania	9,8	Kuwait	10,5	Uruguay	7,8	United States	26,6
15	Turkey	9,6	Poland	10,5	Poland	7,7	Turkey	26,3
16	Sweden	9,4	Palestine	10,4	Estonia	7,4	Poland	26,2
17	Germany	9,4	Iraq	10,3	China	7,4	Hong Kong	26,1
18	Iraq	9,4	South Korea	10,2	South Africa	7,4	China	25,9
19	Lebanon	9,1	Malaysia	10,2	Spain	7,3	South Korea	25,8
20	New Zealand	9,1	Romania	10,1	Jordan	7,2	Argentina	25,6
21	Uruguay	9,1	Thailand	10,1	Cyprus	7,1	Yemen	25,5
22	Algeria	9,0	Spain	10,0	Thailand	6,9	Iraq	25,5
23	Slovenia	8,8	United States	10,0	Morocco	6,9	Uruguay	25,2
24	Morocco	8,8	Jordan	9,9	South Korea	6,9	Taiwan	25,1
25	Argentina	8,8	Sweden	9,8	Palestine	6,9	Trinidad & Tobago	24,9
26	United States	8,7	Hong Kong	9,7	India	6,8	Armenia	24,8
27	South Korea	8,7	Libya	9,7	Romania	6,8	Estonia	24,8
28	Uzbekistan	8,5	Australia	9,7	Belarus	6,6	Chile	24,7
29	South Africa	8,5	Rwanda	9,7	Taiwan	6,5	Morocco	24,5
30	Ecuador	8,5	Estonia	9,6	Brazil	6,3	Azerbaijan	24,4
31	Trinidad & Tobago	8,3	Tunisia	9,6	Ukraine	6,2	Belarus	24,3
32	Philippines	8,2	New Zealand	9,5	Russia	6,2	Thailand	24,2
33	India	8,2	Nigeria	9,5	Turkey	6,2	Ghana	23,9
34	Chile	8,2	Belarus	9,4	Zimbabwe	6,1	Rwanda	23,6
35	Hong Kong	8,2	Kyrgyzstan	9,3	Pakistan	6,0	Lebanon	23,5
36	Colombia	8,1	Pakistan	9,2	Lebanon	5,8	South Africa	23,5
37	Poland	8,1	Kazakhstan	9,1	Kazakhstan	5,8	Tunisia	23,4
38	Belarus	8,0	Ukraine	9,1	Iraq	5,7	India	23,4
39	Russia	8,0	Ghana	9,1	Azerbaijan	5,5	Ukraine	22,9
40	Peru	8,0	Morocco	8,9	Ecuador	5,5	Nigeria	22,6
41	Taiwan	8,0	Trinidad & Tobago	8,7	Nigeria	5,5	Kazakhstan	22,4
42	Netherlands	7,9	Zimbabwe	8,6	Peru	5,3	Pakistan	22,4
43	Estonia	7,9	Peru	8,5	Japan	5,2	Russia	22,4
44	Egypt	7,9	Lebanon	8,5	Algeria	5,2	Kyrgyzstan	22,3
45	Azerbaijan	7,8	India	8,5	Kyrgyzstan	5,2	Algeria	22,2
46	Kyrgyzstan	7,8	Colombia	8,4	Egypt	5,0	Zimbabwe	22,0

End of Table 6

Rank	PERSONAL SECURITY		COMMUNITY SECURITY		NATIONAL SECURITY		TOTAL SECURITY	
47	Zimbabwe	7,7	Chile	8,4	Philippines	5,0	Libya	22,0
48	Libya	7,7	Uruguay	8,3	Ghana	4,7	Peru	21,8
49	Nigeria	7,7	Philippines	8,1	Libya	4,6	Ecuador	21,7
50	Ukraine	7,7	Russia	8,1	Mexico	4,4	Philippines	21,4
51	Kazakhstan	7,6	Algeria	8,0	Armenia	4,3	Malaysia	21,2
52	Brazil	7,6	Argentina	7,9	Yemen	4,2	Brazil	21,0
53	Mexico	7,6	Egypt	7,8	Malaysia	4,1	Egypt	20,7
54	China	7,4	Ecuador	7,7	Rwanda	3,4	Mexico	19,2
55	Pakistan	7,2	South Africa	7,6	Tunisia	3,3	Colombia	
56	Malaysia	7,0	Mexico	7,2	Colombia		Japan	
57	Thailand	7,0	Brazil	7,1	Kuwait		Kuwait	
58	Japan		Qatar		Qatar		Qatar	

THE EXPLANATION OF SUBJECTIVE SECURITY

So far, we have attempted to describe the subjective perception of security in four levels and in 59 countries grouped into seven geo-cultural world regions. We have also attempted to explain what leads to perceive more or less security in the different countries and world geo-cultural regions. To that effect, regression linear models have been computed with different sets of explanatory (independent) variables. Three sets of explanatory variables have been used: socio-demographic, attitudinal, and defence and national. A fourth set of variables was used, composed of 16 variables extracted from the three previous sets that seemed to show strongest explanatory power. In Table 7 the summary of standardized beta coefficients to explain Total Security for the total sample of 59 countries are presented and using the fourth regression model composed of the strongest 16 predictors in the models based on socio-demographic, attitudinal and national defence independent variables.

It may be observed that this set of variables explains 13% of the total variance of the National Security Index and 10% of the Total Security Index, but only 4% and 1% of the Community and the Personal Security Indexes. Most independent variables show a statistically significant contribution (at least .01 level) to the explanation of the variance in each of the four indexes, but that is due mainly to the large number of cases (more than 85,000 in the analysis). However, as already mentioned, the largest proportion of the variance explained is only 13% for the National and Defence Index.

Table 7

Summary of standardized beta coefficients from regression model to explain security indexes for the total sample

	PSI	CSI	NSI	TSI
Adjusted R ² =	.013	.045	.127	.103
Feeling of happiness	.000	.000	-.043**	-.029**
R Family savings	.040**	.030**	.025**	.040**
Social class (subjective)	-.002	.066**	.029**	.045**
Future changes: Greater respect for authority	-.014**	-.030**	-.046**	-.051**
Self positioning in political scale	-.012**	-.006	-.021**	-.020**
Confidence: The armed forces	-.015**	.030**	-.033**	-.011
Confidence: The police	.061**	.109**	.038**	.100**
How important is God in your life	-.067**	-.083**	-.213**	-.206**

End of Table 7

	PSI	CSI	NSI	TSI
Satisfaction with financial situation of household	-.008	.025**	.040**	.032**
Information index	-.028**	-.055**	.021**	-.022**
Post-materialist index (4-item)	.010	-.061**	.065**	.009
Social Position -6	.010	-.059**	.045**	.060**
Willingness to fight for your country	-.018**	.009	-.074**	-.054**
Interest in politics	.027**	.007	-.014**	.013**
How democratically is this country being governed today	.011	.014**	.082**	.059**
How proud of nationality	-.020**	.007	.100**	.049**

** Significant at .01 level.

A more detailed analysis of the data shows that there are only two cases where the percent of the variance explained by this set of 16 variables is greater (6), the TSI in Anglo Saxon countries (14%) and the NSI in European Union countries (14%). The analysis of all the regression models that have been computed can be summarized as follows.

1. The regression model that used 16 selected variables (supposedly with strongest explanatory power) seems to be better than the separate models that used socio-demographic, attitudinal or national-defence variables for the explanation of the variance in each of the four indexes of security. Thus, comparing always the adjusted R^2 within the same geo-cultural region and Security Index, it may be observed that, out of 112 adjusted R^2 only in 13 cases the proportion of the variance explained by the model using 16 combined variables is lower than that explained by some of the other three regression models.

2. The regression model using the 16 combined explanatory variables seems to explain better the National Security Index than the other three (TSI, PSI and CSI). This is true in five of the seven geo-cultural regions. Only in Anglo Saxon countries the set of 16 variables explains a greater proportion of the variance in the Personal Security Index (14% vs. 12%), and in East European and Balkan countries it explains a greater proportion of the variance in the Community Security Index (13% vs. 7%).

3. The results in Table 7 also suggest that confidence in the police and importance of God in one's life seem to be the most important variables in explaining the variance in the four indexes, indicating that the greater the confidence in the police the greater subjective security, and that the less importance of God in one's life, the greater perception of security. Though this is true for the TSI, PSI and CSI, there are differences regarding the National Security Index. Thus, importance of God in one's life is the variable with the strongest (and negative) explanatory power of the variance, but national pride is the second strongest variable, so that those who feel proud of their nationality feel more secure at the National level. Those who think that their country is democratically governed feel also more secure. But those who are willing to fight to defend the country feel less secure at the National level than those who are not willing to fight (precisely that may be the reason for willing to fight to defend the country, because they don't think the Nation is secure) (7).

4. However, there are large differences when comparing geo-cultural regions, always regarding the explanation of Total Security Index. Thus, each geo-cultural region seems to have its own and unique pattern of explanation for its Total Security. In Anglo Saxon countries Total Security is negatively related to importance of God in one's life and positively related to subjective social class. In European Union countries, a positive evaluation of how democratically the country is being governed today is positively related to Total Security, but Importance of God in one's life is negatively related to TSI. In East European and Balkan countries, the less interested in politics and the less exposed to information show higher Total Security. In MENA region countries the less exposed to information and the ones that evaluate positively how their country is governed show higher Total Security. In Asian countries importance of God in one's life and exposure to information are negatively related to Total Security. In Latin American countries, importance of God in one's life is negatively related to Total Security, but confidence in the police is positively related. In Sub-Saharan African countries, positive evaluation of how democratically the country is being governed is positively related to Total Security, but exposure to information is negatively related.

5. Taking into account the two most important explanatory variables for Total Security in the seven geo-cultural regions, it seems that Importance of God in one's life and Exposure to information are the ones that appear more frequently, both with a negative relation.

6. It doesn't seem to need verification that, if so much variation is found when comparing the seven geo-cultural regions, much more variation is found when comparing the 59 countries individually, and much more variation is found when comparing the explanatory power of the 16 variables for each of the other three Security Indexes (Personal, Community and National). Of course, it would be impossible to analyze all these differences in this paper.

7. Table 7 provides information on how each one of the 16 predictors in the regression model contributes to the explanation of each one of the four Security Indexes for the total sample of 59 countries. Thus, regarding the explanation of Personal Security, it seems that importance of God in one's life (negatively related), confidence in the police, family savings, exposure to information (negatively) and interest in politics are the variables that contribute more to the explanation of its variance. However, it must be remembered that the model explains only 1.3% of the variance in PSI. The model explains a greater proportion of the variance in Anglo Saxon countries (6%), and the least in Asian countries (1%). Besides, six variables do not contribute significantly to the explanation of the variance: feeling of happiness, subjective social class, satisfaction with financial situation of the household, post-materialistic values (8), social position (9), and evaluation of how democratically this country is being governed today. However, there are significant differences among the seven regions. Taking into account the two variables with the strongest contribution to the explanation of the variance in each of the seven regions it may be seen that importance of God in one's life is mentioned negatively in three (Anglo Saxon, Latin American and Sub-Saharan Africa), confidence in the police, exposure to information (negatively), social position, and evaluation of how democratically the country is governed today, are men-

tioned among the two strongest in two regions, and family savings (negatively), greater respect for authority in the future (negatively), and post-materialist values (negatively) in one region.

8. With respect to Community Security we have already mentioned (see Table 7) that confidence in the police, importance of God in one's life (negatively), subjective social class, post-materialist values (negatively) and social position are the variables that contribute more to the explanation of its variance in the total sample of 59 countries. However, feeling of happiness, self-positioning in the political scale, willingness to fight for country, interest in politics and national pride do not contribute significantly to the explanation of its variance. And the model explains 4.0% of the variance. The model explains a greater proportion of the variance in East European and Balkan countries (13%) and the least in Latin American countries (3%). Taking into account the two variables with the strongest contribution to the explanation of the variance in each of the seven regions it may be seen that importance of God in one's life is mentioned in three regions (only positively in East European and Balkan countries), and exposure to information is also mentioned in three regions (negatively in all three). Social class, confidence in the police and satisfaction with financial situation of the household are mentioned in two regions each, and interest in politics (negatively), evaluation of how democratically the country is governed, and national pride (negatively) are mentioned in one region each.

9. Regarding National Security it has been said (Table 7) that importance of God in one's life (negatively), national pride, willingness to fight for country (negatively) and interest in politics (negatively), are the variables that contribute more to the explanation of its variance in the total sample of 59 countries. In this case the 16 variables contribute significantly to the explanation of the variance, and jointly they explain 13% of it, though the greater proportion explained is in European Union countries (14%), and the least in Sub-Saharan African countries (7%). Taking into account the two variables with the strongest contribution to the explanation of the variance in each of the seven regions it may be seen that importance of God in one's life is one of the two strongest predictors in five of the seven regions (negatively), desire for greater respect for authority in the future (negatively), exposure to information (negatively), evaluation of how democratically is the country governed today and national pride are among the two strongest in two regions each, and interest in politics (negatively) is also present in one region.

10. Finally, Table 7 shows that Total Security is explained in the total sample of 59 countries mainly by importance of God in one's life (negatively) and confidence in the police. Besides, other variables contributing significantly to the explanation of its variance are social position, evaluation of how democratically is the country governed today and willingness to fight for country (negatively). But confidence in the armed forces and post-materialist values do not contribute significantly to the explanation of its variance. And the model explains 10% of the variance in the total sample of 59 countries. The model explains a greater proportion of the variance in Anglo Saxon and Asian regions (14% and 11% respectively), and the least in Sub-Saharan African region

(3%). Taking into account the two variables with the strongest contribution to the explanation of the variance in each of the seven regions it may be seen that importance of God in one's life and exposure to information (both negatively related) are in four regions among the two variables that contribute more to the explanation of the variance in Total Security. Evaluation of how democratically is the country governed today is among the two in three regions. And subjective social class, confidence in the police and interest in politics (negatively) are present in one region each.

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

Security has become a key value in present societies around the world because of the general change in values since the final years of the 20th century, characterized by a certain return towards more materialistic values, because of a general reduction of personal and economic security, which has accompanied globalization. Increase in insecurity was foreseen from two different but complementary theoretical frameworks. The data from the WVS 2010-14 wave, which includes 59 countries and a total of more than 85,000 interviews, has allowed replication of several surveys in Spain in 2007—08, including the batteries of items to measure different dimensions of security (personal, community and national). Countries were grouped into seven geo-cultural world regions, so that these regions have been used as units of analysis. The change in values has implied not only a reduction of post-materialist values, but also an increase in desires for greater authority in the future, particularly in more developed societies, as “centre” countries from which the change will be transmitted to “periphery” (less developed) countries.

Following previous research, four indexes of security have been computed (personal, community, national and total), each one based on three items, except the total security index, based on the aggregate values of the other three. A summary of the ten more secure and the 10 less secure countries based on the four indexes of perceived or subjective security is as follows: Six of the ten countries with higher Personal security are from the MENA region (Qatar, Jordan, Palestine, Yemen, Tunisia and Kuwait), two from Sub-Saharan Africa (Rwanda and Ghana), one from Asia (Singapore) and one from European Union (Spain). But four of the ten countries with the lower PSI are from Asia (Thailand, Malaysia, Pakistan and China), two from Latin America (Mexico and Brazil) and two from East European and Balkan (Kazakhstan and Ukraine), one from Sub-Saharan Africa (Nigeria) and one from the MENA region (Libya).

With respect to Community security, among the ten more secure countries three are from each of the three following regions: East European and Balkan, Asia and European Union (Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Armenia; China, Singapore and Japan; Slovenia, Cyprus and Germany), and one from the MENA region (Yemen). And among the ten countries with lower perceived CSI five are from Latin America (Brazil, Mexico, Ecuador, Argentina and Uruguay), two from the MENA region (Egypt and Algeria), and one each from Asia (Philippines), East Europe and Balkans (Russia), and Sub-Saharan Africa (South Africa).

Regarding National security, among the ten more secure countries four are from the European Union (Netherlands, Sweden, Germany and Slovenia), two each from Anglo Saxon countries and Latin America (New Zealand and Australia; Argentina and Chile), and one each from Asia (Hong Kong) and East Europe and Balkans (Uzbekistan). And among the ten countries with lower NSI four are from the MENA region (Tunisia, Yemen, Libya and Egypt), two each from Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (Malaysia and Philippines; Rwanda and Ghana), and one each from East Europe and Balkans (Armenia) and from Latin America (Mexico).

Finally, with respect to the Total security, among the ten more secure countries five are from European Union (Sweden, Germany, Netherlands, Slovenia and Spain), two from Anglo Saxon countries (New Zealand and Australia), and one each from Asia (Singapore), East Europe and Balkans (Uzbekistan), and MENA region (Jordan). And among the ten countries with lower Total security, four are from Latin America (Mexico, Brazil, Ecuador and Peru), three from the MENA region (Egypt, Libya and Algeria), two from Asia (Malaysia and Philippines) and one from Sub-Saharan Africa (Zimbabwe).

As might be expected, and has been verified with the data from the sixth wave of the WVS, developed countries seem to feel subjectively more secure than less developed countries, but variation among countries within the same world geo-cultural region is very wide.

This paper has focused not only on the description of differences in the values of security in the mentioned three dimensions (plus one more measure of total security, built through the sum of other three), but it attempts to search for the variables that better explain differences in the indexes of security. On the basis of three sets of variables used to explain the four indexes of security (socio-demographic, attitudinal, national defence and a combination of the previous three) it was found that the combined set seems to be the most robust to explain four indexes of security, but no regression model explains more than 14% of the variance.

The two variables that seem to explain a greater proportion of the variance in the four levels of security (personal, community, national and total) are the importance of God in one's life and confidence in the police, implying that people who do not attach importance to God in their lives and who trust the police perceive in general more personal security, more security in the community where they live, more national security and more total security (10). However, in the case of the explanation of the variance in National Security, national pride and willingness to fight for country show greater explanatory power than confidence in the police. Thus, those who are proud of their country and those not willing to fight for their country in case of war seem to feel more secure at the National level than those who feel insecure (11). In general it can be concluded that the same set of 16 independent variables explains more of the variance in National Security than in Community or Personal security. In general too, national and defence variables explain a greater proportion of the variance than attitudinal or socio-demographic variables, something common to all world regions and to all countries.

It must be underlined that exposure to information usually leads to less, and not to more, perception of security. In fact, it is evident in most countries and with respect to the four indexes of security, that those individuals who are more exposed to media perceive less security than those who are less exposed to media. This is a very important finding that deserves more research, given the growing importance of media consumption in all societies. The first analysis of TV news programs in Spain shows that the great majority of news conveys messages that have a negative content with respect to security, which would explain why people more exposed to media (mainly TV) feel less secure. Another important finding is that there is a great variation in the levels of four types of security, among the seven geo-cultural world regions, and among the countries within a region. This implies that the country continues to be the most important unit of analysis in international comparisons. A second major finding is that the variables used to explain subjective security in any of the four levels cannot really explain an important proportion of the variance (14% seems to be the highest). And this finding supports the idea that to explain perception of security one needs not only subjective measures, but also objective measures, like crime rates, proportion of the PIB devoted to defence, personnel in the armed forces and other security institutions, social and political conflicts, etc. Indicators for these objective measures are more difficult to obtain, but previous research in Spain has suggested that macro-variables (properties of countries rather than of individuals) have more explanatory power than individual properties as the ones deriving from social surveys, as is here the case.

NOTES

- (1) World Values Survey is an international comparative research project on social and cultural values. It has conducted 6 waves since 1981, including a total of more than 100 countries and about half a million personal interviews (www.worldvaluessurvey.org).
- (2) Post-materialist values have been measured through the 4 items scale developed by Inglehart, in which 1 = materialist values, 2 = mixed values and 3 = post-materialist values.
- (3) The distribution of countries by geo-cultural regions is as follows: Anglo Saxon (Australia, New Zealand and United States), European Union (Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and Spain).
- (4) I was not the only one, not even the first one, to differentiate between internal and external security, and between subjective and objective security. Without an specific focus on objective security, the other three terms were already used by Christian Haerpfer in several papers written after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the former Soviet Union [25–27].
- (5) Bahrain has been excluded because it did not have data to compute the indexes of security. Japan was excluded from the PSI; Qatar was excluded from the CSI; Colombia, Kuwait and Qatar were excluded from the NSI; and Colombia, Japan, Kuwait and Qatar were excluded from the TSI, in all cases because they lacked data for some of the items needed for the computation of the specific index of security.
- (6) It must be said that the fourth set of variables always explains a greater percent of the variance in any index and geo-cultural region than the variance explained separately by the models based on socio-demographic, attitudinal or national-defence variables.
- (7) In fact, it is possible that the relationship is the reverse, that is, respondents who feel insecure probably are more willing to defend their country, and they also tend to give more importance to God in their lives.

- (8) This index is based on the 4 items scale as defined by Inglehart [34].
- (9) This index was created by J. Galtung and redefined by J. Díez-Nicolás [11].
- (10) As has been said before, the relationship might be reversed in the sense that people who do not feel secure tends to give more importance to God in their lives.
- (11) Probably the relationship is reversed, that is, people who do not feel secure is more willing to fight to defend their country.

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ТРАКТОВКИ ПОНЯТИЯ «БЕЗОПАСНОСТЬ»: МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫЙ СОПОСТАВИТЕЛЬНЫЙ КОНТЕКСТ*

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Автор рассматривает безопасность как ключевую ценность для всех современных типов обществ, что объясняется радикальным изменением ценностной системы с конца XX в., суть которой состоит в определенном возрождении материалистических ценностей и снижении уровня личной и экономической безопасности под воздействием глобализации. В статье представлены две различные, но взаимодополняющие концептуальные модели социологического анализа проблем безопасности. Первая оформилась в конце 1970-х гг. в ответ на чрезмерный социальный оптимизм, порожденный высоким уровнем и темпами экономического развития в предыдущие десятилетия. В рамках этой модели автор группирует 59 стран в семь геокультурных мировых регионов, где ценностные изменения состояли не только в сокращении постматериалистических предпочтений, но и в возрастании заинтересованности в большем социальном контроле, особенно в развитых странах. Вторая концептуальная модель определяет все формы социальной организации (политические, экономические, семейные, образовательные и пр.), включая ценностные системы как инструменты адаптации общества к своему окружению. Соответственно, здесь основная гипотеза состоит в том, что ценности меняются под влиянием уровня безопасности — и личной, и экономической — и в случае его возрастания, и в ситуации его падения. Автор рассматривает на теоретическом и эмпирическом уровнях четыре индекса безопасности — личный, групповой, государственный и глобальный. Согласно результатам европейских опросов общественного мнения, развитые страны чувствуют себя в большей субъективной безопасности, чем развивающиеся страны, однако даже внутри каждого геокультурного региона наблюдаются серьезные различия. На базе трех групп переменных, объединенных в четыре индекса безопасности (социально-демографические, установочные, госбезопасности и комбинации всех трех), автор показывает, что наибольшим объяснительным потенциалом по отношению ко всем четырем индексам безопасности обладает комбинированный набор переменных. Однако следует помнить о серьезных различиях четырех типов безопасности — как между семью геокультурными регионами, так и между странами внутри каждого из них. Это означает, что именно страна/государство остается наиболее важной единицей анализа в любых межстрановых сопоставлениях, которые, в свою очередь, должны основываться и на субъективном, и на объективном измерениях безопасности.

Ключевые слова: безопасность; материалистические ценности; постматериалистические ценности; геокультурные регионы мира; субъективное и объективное измерения безопасности; индексы безопасности; личная безопасность; групповая безопасность; государственная безопасность; глобальная безопасность.

БЕЗОПАСНОСТЬ КАК КЛЮЧЕВАЯ ЦЕННОСТЬ НЫНЕШНИХ ОБЩЕСТВ

Безопасность всегда играла важную роль в жизни традиционных обществ, но в современном мире обрела фундаментальное значение для всех типов стран — развитых и развивающихся, особенно после окончания Холодной войны. В этот период большинство исследований безопасности фокусировались на националь-

* Данный материал представляет собой краткий реферативный перевод предваряющей его статьи Х. Диаса Николаса на английском языке.

ной или государственной безопасности в ситуации сложного военного (ядерного) баланса между двумя геополитическими блоками. Однако после завершения данного периода трактовка безопасности была пересмотрена и включила в себя личную, социальную, глобальную, общечеловеческую безопасность, которые и будут кратко рассмотрены ниже.

Как правило, понятие безопасности применяется скорее для характеристики государств, чем конкретных людей, поскольку для любого из нас личная безопасность означает гарантии отсутствия угрозы голода, болезней, безработицы, преступности, социальных конфликтов, политических репрессий, экологических загрязнений и т.д., а также отсутствия сбоев в повседневном существовании дома, на работе и в локальных сообществах. Для сотрудников ООН человеческая безопасность — универсальное понятие, состоящее из множества взаимосвязанных компонентов, а потому ее легче обеспечить посредством ранней диагностики ее ключевых индикаторов, чем постфактум, хотя люди предпочитают последнее. Соответственно, сегодня следует отойти от трактовки безопасности как связанной с определенной территорией к человеческой безопасности, от безопасности, гарантируемой оружием, — к безопасности, обеспечиваемой устойчивым социальным развитием, т.е. нужно расширить содержание безопасности экономическими, продовольственными, медицинскими, экологическими, личными, групповыми и политическими аспектами. В настоящее время в условиях глобализации безопасность также должна трактоваться как глобальная, и в качестве угроз глобальной безопасности можно назвать неконтролируемый рост населения (в следующие 50—60 лет оно увеличится вдвое), экономическое неравенство (социальные и экономические различия продолжают возрастать как между государствами, так и внутри стран), миграционное давление (особенно вследствие нынешнего притока в Европу беженцев, спасающихся от голода в регионах Африки к югу от Сахары и от войны и политических репрессий в Сирии, Ираке, Ливии и Афганистане), экологические проблемы (изменение климата, таяние ледников), наркотрафик (организованная преступность, отмывание денег) и международный терроризм (в основном исламские группировки).

Глобализация изменила содержание понятия безопасности, потому что повлекла за собой серьезные трансформации социального ландшафта. Во-первых, прежде индивидам гарантировали безопасность города, затем аналогичную функцию по отношению к своим гражданам стали выполнять государства, но сегодня национальное государство уже не в состоянии обеспечить безопасность, что заставило ученых и политиков обратиться к иным источникам личной и социальной безопасности. П. Билгин [4] предложил понятие «общая безопасность», чтобы подчеркнуть необходимость обеспечения безопасности не против противников, а вместе с ними. Эта идея согласуется с концепцией стабильного мира Ю. Галтунга [22; 24]: он различает негативный мир (отсутствие войны) и позитивный мир (создание условий для социальной справедливости), а также прямое насилие (физическое) и непрямое (структурное и культурное).

Хотя принято различать национальную и международную безопасность, они тесно взаимосвязаны благодаря «зависимости от того политического, юридиче-

ского и военного контекста, который позволяет им не проявляться без резких противоречий» [32]. Кроме того, «постепенно размывается понятие государственных границ, вследствие чего возрождаются прежние понятия — водоразделов, областей или регионов (например, страны Шенгенского соглашения)» [3], поэтому термины «внутренняя безопасность» и «внешняя безопасность» сливаются в единое «поле безопасности», ибо их объединяет общий враг. Соответственно, свобода сегодня — это не ограничение безопасности, а ее условие: безопасность не имеет границ, она глобальна.

Идея слияния внутренней и внешней безопасности, что отражало реалии Холодной войны, сегодня присутствует в большинстве работ, написанных после ее окончания. Однако академическое разделение труда заставляет исследователей в познавательных целях придерживаться разных точек зрения. Например, важный блок литературы фокусируется на внутренней безопасности как гарантируемой полицией и другими органами охраны правопорядка [2; 5; 20; 39; 41]. Проблемы безопасности никогда не были предметом изучения исключительно экспертов по международным отношениям и политике, а привлекали внимание социальных ученых, которых интересовали множественные аспекты безопасности — не только государственные, но также личные и социальные. Лишь в короткий период между окончанием Второй мировой войны и падением Берлинской стены безопасность рассматривалась как не имеющая индивидуального измерения, в основном в развитых странах. Этот период совпал с переходом от индустриального к постиндустриальному обществу, от промышленного капитализма к финансовому, что позволило выделить в проблемах безопасности социологическое содержание и заставило ученых задаться вопросом, почему безопасность стала столь значимой ценностью в современных обществах.

Первая концептуальная система координат в изучении безопасности оформилась в конце 1970-х гг. как реакция на чрезмерный оптимизм, обусловленный высокими темпами экономического роста в предыдущие пятнадцать лет, и ее начало можно связать с первым нефтяным кризисом 1973 г. и публикацией первого доклада Римского клуба «Пределы роста» [38]. Множество известных докладов того времени описывали будущее как результирующее из последовательности событий, запущенных (1) беспрецедентным ростом мирового населения, (2) который приведет к интенсивному потреблению естественных ресурсов, особенно энергии, (3) снизит качество жизни (несмотря на взрывное развитие технологий), (4) увеличит социально-экономическое неравенство стран и отдельных обществ (поскольку индивиды, группы и государства, обладающие властью, стремятся сохранить и улучшить свое качество жизни за счет тех, у кого власти меньше), и это (5) породит скрытые и явные социальные конфликты между странами и внутри них. Предполагалось, что рост числа и масштабов социальных конфликтов заставит властные структуры вернуть себе прежние широкие полномочия и установить более авторитарные политические режимы (левого или правого толка) в качестве максимально быстрого и эффективного способа разрешения конфликтов. Эта гипотеза оказалась в значительной степени подтверждена, осо-

бенно с началом финансового кризиса в 2007 г., который породил высокий уровень социально-экономического неравенства и, соответственно, беспокойства населения, запустив новый виток дискуссий о проблемах безопасности [10; 16].

Данная гипотеза, сформулированная в 1970-е гг., созвучна теории Р. Инглхарта об изменении системы ценностей современного общества: в доиндустриальных обществах преобладают традиционные и материалистические ценности, поскольку люди преимущественно озабочены собственной и экономической безопасностью [33]. После Второй мировой войны эти два источника угроз оказались более или менее подконтрольны благодаря установлению мира в биполярной системе Холодной войны и реализации модели государства всеобщего благосостояния. Однако Всемирное исследование ценностей с 2005 по 2010 гг. показало, что многие развитые страны начали переход от постматериалистических ценностей свободы и самовыражения, усилившихся после окончания Второй мировой войны к 2000 г., к очевидным материалистическим приоритетам и желанию большего контроля вследствие снижения уровня личной безопасности (локальные военные конфликты, война в Персидском заливе, на Балканах, международный и внутренний терроризм, организованная преступность, наркотрафик и т.д.) и экономической безопасности (безработица, ранний выход на пенсию, миграция, финансовый капитализм, глобализация и пр.).

Наращение уровня опасностей во всех областях жизни хорошо прослеживается в новостных выпусках и порождает важное изменение в ценностях, в частности, потребность в более жесткой руке, которая может стать фундаментом авторитарных правительств даже в традиционно демократических странах [14]. Результаты опросных волн Всемирного исследования ценностей в период с 1981 по 2010 г. демонстрируют значительное снижение приверженности населения постматериалистическим ценностям с 2000 г., а также существенный рост запроса на больший контроль, особенно в самых экономически развитых странах. Причем падение значимости постматериалистических ценностей продолжилось и в 2010—2014 гг. в большинстве регионов мира, независимо от уровня их экономического и политического развития, порождая все более выраженный запрос на безопасность и контроль (Кипр, Эстония, Германия, Нидерланды, Словения, Испания, Азербайджан, Армения, Грузия, Кыргызстан, Китай, Япония, Малайзия, Сингапур). Некоторые страны все еще демонстрируют рост значения постматериалистических ценностей, поскольку все еще проходят через этапы индустриализации и модернизации (Польша, Румыния и Украина, Тайвань, Индия, Пакистан и Филиппины, Чили и Мексика). Снижение значения постматериалистических ценностей характерно для более развитых стран, хотя аналогичная тенденция, пусть и менее выражено, прослеживается в Латинской Америке (Аргентина, Перу, Уругвай) и регионах Африки к югу от Сахары (Гана и Руанда).

Считается, что изменение в ценностях выразилось не только в возвращении от постматериалистического мировоззрения к материалистическому, но и в возрождении «безмерного уважения к власти». Согласно Инглхарту, уважение к власти и достигательная мотивация — важнейшие ценности, определившие возмож-

ность индустриализации и модернизации, т.е. перехода от традиционного общества к индустриальному. Однако затем переход от индустриального общества к постиндустриальному был осуществлен, напротив, посредством снижения авторитета власти в большинстве социальных институтов (семья, религия, образование, работа, политика и т.д.) и акцентирования значения личной удовлетворенности и благополучия. Безусловно, до сих пор большинство обществ предпочитают меньший контроль, считая что «большие властные полномочия — это плохо» (Австралия, США, Эстония, Польша), но в основном именно более развитые страны предпочитают больший контроль (Новая Зеландия, Кипр, Германия, Нидерланды, Испания, Швеция, Россия). Получается, что в обозримом будущем развитые страны будут идти в авангарде перехода к материалистическим ценностям и запросу на «большее уважение к власти», подтверждая тем самым теорию центра-периферии [21; 23; 28]: изменение ценностей начинается в социальном центре (в более развитых странах), а отсюда распространяется на социальную периферию (менее развитые страны). Таким образом, если XX в. вошел в историю как столкновение двух важнейших ценностей — свободы и равенства, то в XXI в. его сменила борьба ценностей свободы и безопасности: вопрос в том, какими свободами готовы пожертвовать общества, чтобы гарантировать себе определенный уровень безопасности.

Вторая концептуальная модель анализа безопасности (теория социальной экосистемы [29; 30]) рассматривает все формы социальной организации (политические, экономические, семейные, образовательные и пр.), включая ценностную систему, как инструменты адаптации общества к окружению, посредством которых общества, используя также технологические изобретения (особенно в сфере коммуникации и транспорта), создают материальную и нематериальную культуру для выживания. Эта теоретическая модель позволяет предположить, что мы находимся в той исторической точке, которая способна изменить нынешнюю модель экономической (капитализм, особенно финансовый) и политической организации (парламентская демократия). Эти две модели менялись в истории человечества множество раз, и вряд ли сохранятся навечно, учитывая, что три других элемента социальной экосистемы (население, природа и технологии) радикально изменились за прошедшие десятилетия. Нынешний низкий уровень безопасности может быть следствием объективного и субъективного восприятия изменений в двух социальных моделях — экономической и политической, результаты которых все еще непредсказуемы. Я полагаю, что ценности меняются вследствие изменения уровня безопасности — как личной, так и экономической. Следуя логике Инглхарта, после Второй мировой войны возрос уровень общественной безопасности, но поскольку в последнее время он снизился, ценности вновь меняются, демонстрируя приверженность населения развитых стран материалистическим ценностям и идее жесткого политического контроля.

Достигнутый ранее уровень безопасности снизился в начале XXI в. по той причине, что власть — необходимый элемент любого общества, она может быть экономической — регулирование производства и распределения ресурсов, и по-

литической — управление социальными отношениями посредством нормативных систем, и в истории человечества эти две формы власти либо сотрудничали, либо конфликтовали, но неизменно адаптировались к социальным изменениям, а в последнее время мы наблюдаем расхождение финансовой и экономической властей. В рамках промышленного капитализма экономическая власть (компания) контролировала банки (финансовая власть), но по мере становления финансового капитализма финансовая власть подчинила себе экономическую, чему способствовала глобализация, отменившая привязку финансов к территории, т.е. к политической власти. Сегодня финансовая власть относительно свободна от политического контроля и потому глобальна, тогда как экономическая власть привязана к территории и подчиняется политическим институтам, в частности правительству, что делает ее фрагментарной. Будучи глобальной, финансовая власть стремится максимизировать прибыль в единой мировой системе, перемещая производство в страны с дешевой рабочей силой и запуская миграционные процессы — вместе они увеличивают безработицу в развитых странах и, соответственно, снижают экономическую безопасность среднего и рабочего классов, но приносят прибыль инвесторам и финансовому капиталу в целом.

В годы Холодной войны «свободная рыночная экономика» была вынуждена перераспределять национальные ресурсы справедливо, чтобы избежать экспорта «пролетарской революции» из «мира государственной плановой экономики», особенно в 1960-е и 1970-е гг., следствием чего стала потребительская революция, экспансия социального государства, рост среднего класса и сокращение экономических и социальных различий в развитых странах. Однако после падения Берлинской стены в 1989 г. и исчезновения угрозы «экспорта пролетарской революции» финансовый капитал уже ничто не принуждало к справедливому распределению ресурсов — с 1990-х гг. и по настоящее время мы наблюдаем рост социально-экономической дифференциации и, следовательно, снижение уровня личной и экономической безопасности, что не может не повлечь изменение ценностных систем в пользу большего материализма и авторитаризма и социальные конфликты [19].

ИЗМЕРЕНИЯ ПОНЯТИЯ «БЕЗОПАСНОСТЬ»

В 2007 г. в Испании был проведен первый опрос на репрезентативной национальной выборке в 1200 человек методом личного интервью, чтобы сконструировать *синтетический индекс субъективной безопасности*, объединивший внутреннюю и внешнюю безопасности [15]. Понятие субъективной безопасности реконструировалось через измерение общей самооценки респондентами личной безопасности, а также с помощью 17 различных параметров безопасности, которые могли объяснить уровень общей самооценки: 1) удовлетворенность жизнью; 2) самооценка здоровья; 3) восприятие изменений в самооценке личной безопасности за последние десять лет; индексы: 4) аффективной безопасности, 5) соседской безопасности; 6) восприятия проблем по соседству; 7) ежедневных опасений и тревог; 8) беспокойства о здоровье и личной неприкосновенности; 9) тревоги

о внешних и экологических условиях; 10) личных мер предосторожности; 11) автомобильных мер предосторожности; 12) жилищных мер предосторожности; 13) доступа к оружию; 14) личных семейных экономических тревог; 15) личных социально-экономических переживаний; 16) внешних-международных угроз; 17) личного опыта виктимизации. Каждый параметр измерялся с помощью нескольких закрытий или индикаторов, которые затем посредством статистических процедур (частотные распределения, корреляционная матрица, факторный анализ методом главных компонент) были объединены в индексы.

Проведенный анализ показал, что общую самооценку личной безопасности определяют три индекса — восприятие безопасности соседства, проблемы по соседству и ежедневные личные страхи и тревоги, поэтому было принято решение сконструировать индекс субъективной безопасности на основе этих трех индексов. Поскольку каждый индекс был результатом комбинации разных индикаторов или вопросов, было сконструировано шесть индексов, чтобы оценить валидность результатов. Несмотря на серьезные различия в их конструкциях, оказалось, что все шесть индексов схожим образом определяли общую самооценку личной безопасности, т.е. используемые в измерении индикаторы были взаимозаменяемы. Иными словами, в измерении безопасности важна концептуальная модель измерения, а не конкретные вопросы-индикаторы. Тем не менее, использованные в исследовании 25 индикаторов позволяют оценивать субъективный индекс безопасности в разных культурах, потому что достаточно выбрать 6 ключевых индикаторов и замерить их посредством дихотомических шкал.

Предложенная модель измерения позволяет проводить регрессионный анализ на основе разных сочетаний независимых переменных — как микроуровня (социально-демографические параметры, социальный статус, установки/идеологические предпочтения, место жительства), так и макроуровня (структурные социально-экономические параметры) — для оценки субъективного индекса безопасности как зависимой переменной. Можно также использовать индексы субъективной безопасности как независимые переменные в регрессионных моделях, призванных объяснить вариации зависимых переменных (например, общая удовлетворенность жизнью, тревоги о здоровье, об экологических угрозах, доступ к оружию и др.) в сочетании с другими независимыми переменными (социально-демографические характеристики, социальный статус, установки, место жительства и др. социально-экономические структурные показатели).

В 2008 г. в Мадриде по идентичной методологии (воспроизводилась пошагово) и инструментарию прошел второй опрос — выборки в 8600 человек в 21 городском округе, чтобы иметь возможность провести сравнительный анализ. Были получены практически аналогичные результаты с незначительными различиями по ряду округов в силу состава населения. Поскольку опрос проводился только в городах, было добавлено еще одно измерение безопасности — воспринимаемые на уровне городского округа угрозы, которые замерялись с помощью 13 закрытий/индикаторов. Конструкция субъективного индекса безопасности была несколько изменена, потому что факторный анализ методом главных компонент

выявил два аспекта дополнительного измерения безопасности — оценка серьезных угроз и оценка несерьезных угроз.

По итогам двух независимых опросов в Испании в целом и Мадриде можно сделать следующие выводы: 1) были продемонстрированы валидность и надежность субъективного индекса безопасности даже на основе разных индикаторов при условии, что они характеризуют три измерения безопасности, указанные выше; 2) существует сильная связь между субъективным индексом безопасности и общей самооценкой личной безопасности, что свидетельствует о зависимости ощущения безопасности от трех групп факторов — восприятия безопасности соседства, оценки проблем соседства и ежедневных страхов и тревог; 3) индивидуальные микро-переменные (социально-демографические и ценностные) мало влияют на значения субъективного индекса безопасности; 4) наоборот, макро-переменные социального контекста имеют большой предсказательный потенциал применительно к значениям субъективного индекса безопасности; 5) регион проживания в Испании не влияет на субъективный индекс безопасности — важно, в каком городском округе проживает респондент, т.е. каково его соседское окружение.

По результатам опросов в Мадриде, Испании и в рамках волн Всемирного исследования ценностей было выделено три уровня безопасности: личный, групповой и национальный. После ряда статистических процедур для каждого уровня безопасности был сконструирован собственный индекс, а также четвертый индекс, объединяющий ключевые компоненты всех трех и разные измерения безопасности:

◆ *Индекс личной безопасности* (Personal Security Index — PSI): предпочитают не выходить из дома по ночам, не ношу с собой много денег, всегда имею при себе нож, пистолет или другое оружие.

◆ *Индекс групповой безопасности* (Community Security Index — CSI): продажа наркотиков на улицах, грабежи, потребление алкоголя на улицах.

◆ *Индекс национальной безопасности* (National Security Index — NSI): боюсь международной войны, террористических атак, гражданской войны.

◆ *Общий индекс безопасности* (Total Security Index — TSI): сумма трех индексов. Поскольку значение каждого из входящих в его состав индексов может меняться от 3 (низкий уровень безопасности) до 12 (высокий уровень безопасности), то значения общего индекса безопасности меняются от 9 до 36.

Следует отметить, что ощущение безопасного соседства (в относительно небольшом пространстве, где протекает повседневная жизнь человека) положительно влияет на общий индекс безопасности и все три его компонента, хотя в наибольшей степени все же на индекс групповой безопасности, а в наименьшей — на индекс национальной безопасности, однако подобные различия, видимо, объясняются тем, что соответствующие вопросы анкеты различались в рамках испанского и европейского опросов. Наиболее существенные расхождения в результатах опросов в разных регионах мира обнаруживаются по параметру «ношения ножа или оружия», который используется для конструирования индекса личной безопасности, будучи индикатором крайней степени личной тревожности.

Региональные различия здесь существенны: самый высокий показатель прослеживается в англосаксонских странах (8,6%) и регионах Африки к югу от Сахары (8%), он снижается в Восточной Европе и на Балканах (4%) и Европейском Союзе (2,6%).

В целом по всем выборкам уровень групповой безопасности выше, чем другие два индекса, а уровень национальной безопасности — существенно ниже, чем личной безопасности. Различия между геокультурными регионами незначительны по показателям личной и групповой безопасности, но серьезно возрастают в случае национальной безопасности. В результате общий индекс безопасности выше в Европейском Союзе и англосаксонских странах, снижается в Азии, Восточной Европе и на Балканах, в Латинской Америке, на Ближнем Востоке, в Северной Африке и регионах к югу от Сахары. В англосаксонских странах выше уровень личной безопасности, чем в Европейском Союзе, на Ближнем Востоке и в Северной Африке — он еще больше возрастает, однако самые высокие показатели характерны для регионов Африки к югу от Сахары. Уровень групповой безопасности, наоборот, выше в Европейском Союзе и Азии, чем в англосаксонских странах, Восточной Европе и на Балканах, а самые низкие его показатели демонстрируют страны Латинской Америки и Африки к югу от Сахары. Уровень национальной безопасности выше в Европейском Союзе и англосаксонских странах, чем во всех прочих регионах, а самые низкие его показатели характерны для стран Африки и Ближнего Востока.

ИЗМЕРЕНИЕ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ В МЕЖДУНАРОДНОМ СОПОСТАВИТЕЛЬНОМ КОНТЕКСТЕ

В большинстве стран уровень групповой безопасности выше, чем личной или национальной, и лишь в двух странах из вошедших в выборку уровень национальной безопасности оказался выше всех прочих индексов — в Аргентине и Швеции. В 17 странах индекс личной безопасности превышает все прочие: в Алжире, Австралии, Бразилии, Эквадоре, Палестине, Гане, Иордании, Ливане, Мексике, Филиппинах, Катаре, Руанде, ЮАР, Испании, Тунисе, Египте и Уругвае. Среди 10 стран с наивысшим индексом личной безопасности оказались шесть из Северной Африки и Ближнего Востока, одна из Азии и остальные из Европейского Союза, что говорит либо о том, что менее развитые страны наслаждаются повседневной безопасностью либо же что они привыкли к высокому уровню опасности и не осознают ее как таковую.

Неудивительно, что Мексика и Бразилия оказались на 53 и 52 местах из 59 стран по индексу личной безопасности, если вспомнить новостные сообщения об убийствах и всех видах насилия, которые широко здесь распространены. То же самое можно сказать о Китае, Пакистане, Малайзии и Таиланде, однако по другим причинам — политической нестабильности, например. Кроме того, опросы показывают серьезные различия между странами внутри геокультурных регионов, например, между Испанией (второе место в рейтинге личной безопасности) и Нидерландами (42 место). Вопрос в том, насколько эти различия реальны

или же они зависят от того, какой уровень небезопасности граждане каждой страны воспринимают как угрожающий или не угрожающий. Это общая проблема всех субъективных индикаторов, поэтому всегда следует выделять субъективный и объективный уровни безопасности и проводить их сравнительный анализ.

Бразилия и Мексика продемонстрировали и самый низкий индекс групповой безопасности, заняв две последние позиции соответствующего рейтинга, перед ними идут ЮАР, Эквадор и Египет, недалеко от них ушли страны Латинской Америки. Неудивительно, что для англосаксонских стран и Европейского Союза характерны самые высокие показатели национальной безопасности, тогда как в конце данного рейтинга оказалось большинство менее развитых стран. И, наконец, общий индекс безопасности вывел в лидеры рейтинга наиболее развитые страны (англосаксонские и европейские), хотя внутри каждого геокультурного региона наблюдается серьезная дифференциация по уровню безопасности (например, между Сингапуром и Малайзией в Азии). Каждый регион отличают свои уникальные характеристики в сфере безопасности: например, в англосаксонских странах общий индекс безопасности отрицательно коррелирует с важностью веры в Бога и, наоборот, позитивно — с субъективной классовой идентификацией; в Восточной Европе и на Балканах наименее заинтересованные в политике и наименее информированные респонденты демонстрируют более высокую уверенность в общей безопасности, тогда как в Северной Африке и на Ближнем Востоке наименее информированные и довольные тем, как выстроена система управления в стране, обладают самым высоким уровнем общей безопасности и т.д.

В целом полученные данные позволяют утверждать, что две наиболее важные (хотя с обратным воздействием) для общего индекса безопасности объяснительные переменные во всех геокультурных регионах — это важность веры в Бога и информированность. Чем более информирован человек, тем выше, как правило, он оценивает уровень опасности. В большинстве стран, если оценивать четыре индекса безопасности, наиболее подверженные медийному воздействию респонденты обычно ниже оценивают уровень безопасности, чем не обращающиеся к средствам массовой информации. Это очень важный результат, который требует дальнейшего изучения, учитывая все возрастающую роль медийного потребления в жизни всех обществ.