

# Comparative Sociology

Co So

Volume I *no. 3-4* 2002

Co So

*Special issue*

Human Values and Social Change,  
Findings from the Values Surveys

*Guest editor:* Ronald Inglehart

Brill

## Contents

### Special Issue

### **Human Values and Social Change: Findings from the Values Surveys**

Edited by Ronald Inglehart

- iii *Notes on Contributors*
- vii *Acknowledgement of Referees*
- 231 RONALD INGLEHART  
Introduction to this Issue
- 235 PIPPA NORRIS and RONALD INGLEHART  
Islamic Culture and Democracy: Testing the 'Clash of Civilizations' Thesis
- 265 YILMAZ ESMER  
Is There an Islamic Civilization?
- 299 MANSOOR MOADDEL and TAQHI AZADARMAKI  
The Worldviews of Islamic Publics: The Cases of Egypt, Iran, and Jordan
- 321 RONALD INGLEHART, PIPPA NORRIS and CHRISTIAN WELZEL  
Gender Equality and Democracy
- 347 EPHRAIM YUCHTMAN-YA'AR  
Value Priorities in Israeli Society: An Examination of Inglehart's Theory of Modernization and Cultural Variation
- 369 RUSSELL J. DALTON, PHAM MINH HAC, PHAM THANH NGHI and NHU-NGOC T. ONG  
Social Relations and Social Capital in Vietnam: Findings from the 2001 World Values Survey

- 387 NEIL NEVITTE and MEBS KANJI  
Authority Orientations and Political Support: A Cross-national  
Analysis of Satisfaction with Governments and Democracy
- 413 HENNIE KOTZÉ and KARIN LOMBARD  
Revising the Value Shift Hypothesis: A Descriptive Analysis  
of South Africa's Value Priorities between 1990 and 2001
- 439 THORLEIF PETTERSSON  
Individual Values and Global Governance: A Comparative  
Analysis of Orientations towards the United Nations
- 465 JUAN DíEZ-NICOLÁS  
Two Contradictory Hypotheses on Globalization: Societal  
Convergence or Civilization Differentiation and Clash
- 495 ALEJANDRO MORENO  
Corruption and Democracy: A Cultural Assessment
- 509 *Review Essay*
- 515 *Book Review Section*
- 523 *List of Books Received*
-

# Two Contradictory Hypotheses on Globalization: Societal Convergence or Civilization Differentiation and Clash\*

JUAN DíEZ-NICOLÁS\*\*

## Theoretical Framework

For more than two centuries social scientists have struggled with the hen and egg problem, that is, whether the economic system, the political system or the cultural system determines the other two systems (Marx 1904; Weber 1946; Pareto 1921; Lasswell 1977). From social ecosystem theory, economic, political and cultural organizations are instrumental responses that human populations develop to adapt to their (natural and social) environment within a given state of the arts (technology) (Hawley 1986; Duncan 1964). From this theoretical perspective, social ecosystems have expanded through time on the basis of the interaction of the four elements of the ecosystem: population, environment, social organization and value systems (non-material culture) and technology (material culture) (Hawley 1986; Díez-Nicolás 1982, 1995, 1999). The history of mankind has been a continuous process of expansion from small autarchic independent communities to large interdependent communities. In this process, isomorphic processes tend to produce similar social organizational structures to facilitate exchange and communication among increasingly interdependent social systems. Obviously, isomorphism takes place earlier with respect to economic systems (because exchange and

---

\* A first attempt to refute Fukuyama's and Huntington's theories (or more precisely, ideologies) was presented at the UN sponsored FOURTH INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON URBAN POVERTY held in Marrakech in October 2001 (Díez-Nicolás 2001).

\*\* Complutense University, Madrid.

interaction among societies generally comes first, and because of economic interdependence), which explains why economic systems have historically been relatively homogeneous within wide world regions, while showing great political and cultural variation within them.

Fukuyama (1991) has rightly observed a general trend of societies to adopt a single economic system model and a single political system model. After the Berlin wall fell in 1989, and with it the Soviet Empire, its alternative economic and political systems disappeared. Free market economy (capitalism) and parliamentary democratic systems (based on the existence of competing political parties) today seem to be the only viable economic and political models, in such a way that virtually all societies either claim to have attained them, or to be in the process of attaining them. But Fukuyama is wrong in deriving from that fact that capitalist liberal democracy will be "the end of history," just as other utopias have failed in assuming that nothing could come after them. Plato's ideal polis, Campanella's City of the Sun, More's Utopia, and Marx and Lenin's "classless society" are a few examples of this phenomenon. Even though we cannot foresee when, how, why and what will substitute for parliamentary democracy and free market economy, it is probable that new forms of economic and political organizations will develop, as the other three elements of the ecosystem change over time. Even today criticisms of the performance of both free market economy and parliamentary democracy (Shearmur 1996; Giddens 2000; Beck 1999; Hutton & Giddens 2000) are increasingly common. But Fukuyama has not taken into account the role of culture, of belief and value systems, which as Weber rightly demonstrated, influence economic and political systems. Most societies today claim to have attained or to be in the process of attaining a parliamentary democracy and a free market economy (only recently NATO officially accepted that Russia is a free market economy, as if such recognition were a matter of political decision and not of economic behavior). But this does not necessarily mean that they really have attained it. Quite the contrary, the evidence shows that some democracies are deteriorating, and that some democracies are really not democracies in the full sense of that concept, even if they are politically accepted as such. Great differences are found between some free market economies and others, and a great variety of policies are approved to obviate the free market and to mask protectionist and monopolistic or oligarchic markets instead. The evidence of the increasing inequalities among countries and within countries should not be neglected in this context.

The first hypotheses that will be tested in this research is that there is a clear relationship between economic, political and cultural systems in

the world today, in the sense that high levels of economic development are directly related to democratic political systems, and that both are directly related to a particular value system that may be labeled as "post-modern." But, related to this hypotheses, it is also proposed that, even if we accept the existence of a general trend for social systems to adopt free market economy and parliamentary democracy, great differences remain in levels of economic and political development among countries around the world. Similarly large differences are also found in value systems, though there is also a growing trend towards isomorphism in this realm, as a consequence of the increase in exchanges and communications among countries around the world, facilitated by developments in transportation and communication technologies. The reduction of the cost and time of travel have brought a reduction of social distance, facilitating and even encouraging mass population movements, just as the increasing ease of communication among individuals favor human contacts, exchange of ideas, and therefore the homogenization of cultural and value systems on a world wide basis. Very important differences in the realm of values and cultural systems persist, and in some cases new social movements attempt to counteract "globalization" not only of economic institutions but also of value systems.

In contrast to Fukuyama's hypotheses of convergence in political and economic systems because of globalization, Huntington (1996) has proposed an opposite hypothesis about the existence of seven great cultural systems or civilizations: Confucian-Chinese, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Western, Latin American and African. How he arrives at seven such civilizations, and not at fourteen, five or thirty is not fully explained: It depends on what dimension one selects to classify reality. Thus, if one classifies living organisms in two classes, mammals and non-mammals, whales and humans would be in the same category, but apart from being mammals there seem to be no other traits that would justify putting whales and humans in the same basket. The basis for Huntington's classification seem to include religious, linguistic, historical and geographical criteria, and his argumentation lead to some confusion, so that some authors interpret him as referring to nine civilizations (the additional two being the Orthodox and the Buddhist) (Norris & Inglehart 2002). Huntington's thesis has two main assumptions: first, that the civilizations he defines are internally relatively homogeneous around one or more of the dimensions used for classifying them (religion, language, etc.), and that each such civilization is distinctively different from other civilizations. Second, that because civilizations are different, they will necessarily conflict or "clash" with each other. Huntington seems to overlook the fact that the countries that he considers parts of one civilization, Western Europe, have been

fighting each other for centuries, and that the last of those wars took place only seventy years ago. Huntington's main propositions have been widely discussed and criticized from a sociological perspective (Höfert & Salvatore 2000; Haller 2002; Norris & Inglehart 2002), but also from an ideological-strategic-military perspective (del Valle 2000). The fact that Huntington takes religion and other cultural dimensions as the basis for classifying civilizations makes it possible to try to confront his assumptions on internal homogeneity and external differentiation through the valuable data on social and cultural values provided by the World Values Surveys.<sup>1</sup>

According to Inglehart (1977, 1990 and 1997), there is a general trend in value change that seems to be at least two-fold, from scarcity or survival values to self-expression values, and from traditional values to rational-secular values. This hypothesis has been tested and verified broadly and widely by Inglehart and others. This change in values seems to be universal, though at different levels, providing a gradient of societies along a continuum from societies which are still very close to the survival-scarcity pole, while others are very close to the self-expression-security pole, and another gradient where some societies can still be classified as traditional while others can be classified as rational-legal, following the Weberian terminology. Furthermore, the level a society has attained in those two axes seems to be related to the degree that its political institutions have developed towards a parliamentary democracy, as well as to the degree that it has attained a certain level of economic development. Inglehart has extensively reported on the high positive relationship between the economic, the political and the cultural systems (Inglehart 1999, 2001).

But, though findings have unequivocally shown some clustering of societies among those dimensions, they do not exclude a great degree of variation within the groups that may be constructed. Once more, one should not forget that reality does not come classified, but that researchers classify reality through a set of categories that are arbitrarily defined, though on the basis of arguments derived from theory. Accepting the existence of certain groups of societies that share particular set of values does not necessarily imply that they should "clash" with each other. Haller (2001) has rightly described how societies may have positive and friendly relations, or negative and conflictual relations, based on equal or different levels of socio-economic development and/or similar or different cultural systems.

---

<sup>1</sup> The WVS data that are used here are the officially approved datasets for the 1995 wave (WVS1995\_V2\_1.sav) and the provisionally approved version for the 2000 wave (WVS2000\_V3.sav), by the World Values Survey Association, as well as the EVS provisional version for the 1999 wave (EVS99#03.sav) (Halman 2001).

The hypothesis that will be tested here is that, though there seems to be a general trend in value change along the lines defined by Inglehart, there are great differences among countries and world regions with respect to the extent to which change along the lines described above has taken place. Furthermore, it will be argued that variation within civilizations, to use Huntington's terminology, is greater than among civilizations, an assertion that was established by Stein Rokkan (Merrit & Rokkan 1966) many decades ago when referring to within-country or between-country differences. Not only that, but it will also be argued that differences in value systems within individuals in a society and differences among societies derive from socio-economic differences more than from so called regional or civilization groupings.

Since a great part of Huntington's book is devoted to the future "clash" between the Western Christian World versus the Islamic Civilization, it may be relevant to mention that political events during the past years have shown that some Islamic societies have been considered as "good" allies by the Western alliance (Bosnia, Kosovo, Azerbaijan, Chechnya, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and most especially Turkey), while others have been defined as "evil" (Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Palestine, Somalia, Yemen, Syria or Pakistan). An alternative hypothesis might be that the cleavages between and among societies are based more on their socio-economic than on their "cultural" differences, something that seems to explain great and significant value differences within some of the usually accepted groupings of societies.

A final hypothesis to reject Huntington's assertion about the clash of civilizations is that when individuals move from more traditional and less developed "civilizations" to societies that are more developed and post-modern, they tend to diverge from the value system prevalent in their original culture and to adopt the values of the receiving society, because value systems are instrumental for individuals to better adapt to their natural and social environment (Hawley 1986; Diez-Nicolás 1982).

### **The Relationship between Economic, Political and Cultural Systems**

Inglehart has verified the hypotheses that economic, political and cultural systems are related in several of his most recent writings (Inglehart 1997, 1999, 2001; Norris & Inglehart 2002). We replicate that test here, using GNP per capita to measure a country's economic level, the Human Development Index (HDI) to measure human development, Freedom House ratings on civic liberties to measure democratic development, and the difference between the proportions of post-materialists and materialists,

using the common four items scale developed by Inglehart<sup>2</sup> for 81 societies. As expected, all correlation coefficients were very strong and statistically significant at the .01 level: the correlation between GNP and Post-materialism is .66, HDI-Post-materialism (.56), and FHR-Post-materialism (.46), with the FH ratings inverted so that higher values indicate higher ratings of civic liberties. Additionally, GNP-HDI (.82), GNP-FHR (.69) and HDI-FHR (.70) correlations are also very high and statistically significant. Clearly, countries with higher economic levels, with higher social well-being levels, and with more democratic forms of government show higher levels of modern (self expression) values. This finding is not new. It validates once more Inglehart's scale for measuring value change, something that by itself has been a great contribution to the explanation of social and cultural change. The reason to examine these findings here, is that they sometimes lead to the ideological misconception that the world is converging towards similar economic and political (and eventually cultural) systems, in the sense that Fukuyama seems to have pretended, similarly to Kahn and Wiener's optimistic predictions of "economic development for all in the year 2000" (Kahn & Wiener 1967).

Quite on the contrary, differences in GNP per capita between societies are increasing, not decreasing — as was predicted after the first oil crisis of 1973 (Council on Environmental Quality and Department of State 1980; Díez-Nicolás 1980; United Nations 1987). Thus, in 1963 the GNP per capita in the richest world region (North America) was 40 times higher than in the poorest region (using the standard UN definition of world regions), and the economic and social policies during the following decade resulted in a certain decrease of between-regions inequalities (in 1973 the richest region had 39 times the GNP per capita of the poorest region). But after the 1973 oil crisis, between-countries economic inequality increased continuously, so that by 1983 the ratio was 51 times, by 1991 it was 91 times, and by 2000 it was 108 times. The Human Development Report

---

<sup>2</sup> The data have been collected for the 81 individual countries included either on the 1995 and/or the 2000 WVS waves or the 1999 EVS wave. The most recent data file for each country has been selected, so that 17 belong to the 1995 WVS wave (with a total of 25,147 cases), 31 belong to the 1999 EVS wave (with a total of 37,704 cases), and 33 belong to the 2000 WVS (with a total of 50,398 cases). The Freedom House ratings were chosen for the period 1997-98, even though data for later years were available, to match the period 1995-2000 covered by the surveys. For similar reasons, GNP and HDI country data were taken from PNUD, Human Development Report, 2001, and the data refer to 1999, though there is a later edition for 2002. Measurement of post-materialism has been based on the four items scale more widely used (maintain order in society, participation in important political decisions, fight raising prices and defend freedom of expression), in which the first and third items measure materialist values, and the second and fourth items measure post-materialist values.

for 2002 provides even more spectacular comparisons between the richer and the poorer countries. The Human Development Index series from 1975 to 1999 also shows increasing, not decreasing, differences between countries. The Freedom House ratings show a less clear pattern, probably due to the fact that many countries have adopted the “formal” appearance of parliamentary democracies, though hiding sometimes non-democratic regimes, and to the fact that their index has a much shorter variation between the highest and the lowest values. As for the change in values, Inglehart has shown that there seems to be a predominance of change towards more post-materialist values in most societies, though the data for 2000 show some opposite trends in some parts of the world, and more specifically in Latin America.

### **Are Civilizations Significant Units for Sociological Analysis?**

In order to test Huntington’s hypotheses, WVS countries have been grouped along the lines of the seven civilizations he defined, taking also into consideration some of his own sub-divisions, and others that have been used by Norris and Inglehart (2002). Considering that some of the “civilization clashes” also involve the old division between the Western and Eastern empires deriving from the breakup of the Roman Empire, reinforced by the separation of Roman Catholics and Orthodox churches, and the division between Catholic and Protestant Europe, as well as the apparent distinctiveness of Anglo-Saxon countries from the rest of Western countries, the 81 countries for which WVS data were available have been grouped into twelve World regions.<sup>3</sup>

To test Huntington’s argument regarding the internal homogeneity of civilizations and their distinctiveness with respect to other civilizations, the three objective indicators reported above (GNP, HDI and FHR), have been used for the 81 countries grouped into 12 world regions. We find

---

<sup>3</sup> The twelve regions and the countries they include are the following: Anglo-Saxon (5): Britain, USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. West European Catholic (11): France, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Ireland, Switzerland, Portugal, Austria, Luxembourg and Malta. West European Protestant (7): West Germany, Denmark, North Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Iceland and Finland. East European Christian (10): Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, East Germany, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Croatia and Slovakia. European Orthodox (14): Belarus, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Ukraine, Russia, Moldavia, Georgia, Armenia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia and Srpska. Latin America (10): Mexico, Argentina, Puerto Rico, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Venezuela, Uruguay, Dominican Republic and Colombia. Islam (11): Pakistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Albania, Egypt, Morocco, Iran, Jordan and Algeria. Sinic-Confucian (4): South Korea, China, Taiwan and Vietnam. Japan (1). India (1). African Sub Saharan (5): South Africa, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Uganda. Others (2): Philippines and Israel.

that the differences between regions with the highest and the lowest values in each of them, as measured by the ratio between the two figures, are often smaller than those found comparing the countries with the highest and lowest values within each region. Thus, the West European Protestant region had a GNP per capita 8.8 times that of African sub-Saharan countries, a HDI 1.8 times higher, and a FHR 2.0 times higher than that of the same African region. But the ratios between the highest and lowest value of individual countries with respect to GNP in the African sub-Saharan and the Sinic-Confucian regions, or with respect to FHR in the Eastern Orthodox, the Islamic, the Sinic-Confucian and the African sub-Saharan regions, are larger. Besides, the ratio between the highest and lowest values in those three indicators, disregarding regions, was 85 times when comparing the GNP per capita of Luxembourg and Tanzania, and 40 times when comparing the FHR of many western countries and that of China. These findings by themselves not only show that differences between countries and regions with respect to their degree of economic and political development continue to be very large, but they also show that within-region differences may be greater than between-regions differences.

Apart from these macro-economic and macro-political indicators, Huntington's thesis has been tested at the micro- or individual level. To this effect, some questions from the values-surveys studies were selected to measure religious and political attitudes, as well as other questions that would measure personal well-being, social capital, and attitudes toward the role of women. The selection of these questions was based, apart from theoretical considerations (Norris & Inglehart 2002), on other more pragmatic grounds regarding possibilities for comparison. In fact, a section of this paper will compare the attitudes of migrants into Spain from different world regions, with the attitudes of the populations in their countries of origin, and with the Spanish population as the receiving society. While the data for countries of origin and the receiving country were drawn from the 1995-2000 surveys, the data regarding migrants were obtained from a survey on migrants into Spain in 2001. Some relevant questions from the WVS questionnaires were included in that survey. Thus, the comparative analysis of migrants' values with those of the populations in their regions of origin and in Spain include the following variables:

- Personal Well-being: Happiness and satisfaction with one's life.
- Social Capital: Freedom of choice and control of one's life, and interpersonal trust.
- Support for Democracy: Opinion on how good or bad it would be to have a government based on a Strong leader, the decisions of Experts, the Army, or a Democratic system.

- Religiosity: Importance of God in one's life and getting comfort in religion.
- Role of Women: Opinion on whether women need to have children in order to be fulfilled.
- Post-materialist or Post-modern values: Difference in the percent of R's who are categorized as post-materialist or materialist in the 4 item values scale developed by Inglehart.

The following analysis is based on more than 113,000 interviews in 81 different countries that represent more than 80% of the world's population in the five continents and all of the main "civilizations" or cultures, showing very different levels of economic and political development, as has been shown above. The differences among regions were in the expected direction, showing that Anglo-Saxons, West Europeans (both Catholic and Protestant) and Latin Americans are more satisfied with their life and are happier than the rest. Anglo-Saxons and West European Protestants, and to a certain degree also Latin Americans, Sinic-Confucians and Japanese show higher values on social capital indicators than citizens from other regions (though Latin American show a very low degree of social trust). Religiosity is more prominent in Islamic, African sub-Saharan and Latin American societies, and a more traditional attitude towards the role of women also predominates in Islamic and European Orthodox societies as well as in India. Democracy is considered almost unanimously as the best form of government in all regions, but a government based on a strong leader who has not to struggle with a Parliament, or based on the rule of the armed forces is considered good relatively more in Latin American and Sinic-Confucian countries. Finally, post-materialist values predominate exclusively in Anglo-Saxon societies, while materialist values predominate in all other regions, and very remarkably in European Orthodox, Islamic and Sinic-Confucian societies, as well as in India.

To simplify the analysis below, only one indicator from each dimension has been chosen. Satisfaction of life and happiness are highly correlated (.47), but the former has been used because its scale provides greater variation. Interpersonal trust has been preferred to freedom of choice and control over one's life because it is the most common indicator of social trust used in the literature (Putnam, Leonardi & Nanetti 1993), and because the latter is better correlated with life satisfaction and happiness (.42 and .25 respectively) than with trust (.05), which suggests that it is probably a better indicator of social well-being than of interpersonal trust. The correlation between the importance of God in one's life and getting comfort from religion is very high (.72), but the former has been selected because it is based on a ten point scale while getting comfort is a dichotomous variable. The four indicators on forms of government are highly correlated, but the one

**Table 1**  
Attitudinal indicators by Cultural Regions, 1995-2000\*

	Anglo-Saxon	West European Catholic	West European Protestant	East European Christian	European Orthodox	Latin American	Islamic	Sinic-Confucian	Japan	India	African sub-Saharan
	N= (7,380)	(14,698)	(7,208)	(11,378)	(17,430)	(16,027)	(21,193)	(3,975)	(1,362)	(2,002)	(8,197)
<b>Personal Well-Being:</b>											
Satisfaction with life (mean on scale 0-10)	7.64	7.56	7.89	6.31	5.00	7.71	5.80	6.44	6.48	5.14	5.55
% Very Happy	36	32	35	12	9	33	20	24	28	25	44
<b>Social Capital:</b>											
% Most people can be Trusted	38	30	51	22	22	14	29	38	40	39	14
Freedom of choice and Control of one's life (mean on scale 0-10)	7.65	6.87	7.40	6.51	5.94	7.66	5.92	7.29	6.00	5.65	6.60
<b>Religiosity:</b>											
Importance of God in one's life (mean on scale 0-10)	6.43	6.31	5.34	5.49	6.63	9.12	9.45	5.41	5.02	7.60	9.38
% Get Comfort in Religion	54	56	47	47	58	60	91	32	24	79	92
<b>Role of Women:</b>											
% Women need Children	19	40	31	58	76	41	78	63	44	82	66
<b>Political Attitudes:</b>											
% Strong leader is good or very good	23	24	16	23	41	44	27	43	24	43	28
% Government of Experts is good or very good	41	42	39	64	53	59	47	52	47	46	50
% Army rule is good or very good	6	4	3	5	14	25	27	36	2	14	21
% Democratic system is good or very good	81	87	91	79	74	83	82	80	80	68	87
<b>Post-materialism:</b>											
% Post-materialists	24	19	14	8	5	14	7	6	9	2	7
Difference in % post-materialist/materialist	+17.1	-2.3	-4.5	-24.7	-40.2	-5.8	-32.6	-32.8	-7.1	-36.7	-28.8

\* See notes 3 and 4 for explanation on the origin of the survey data and the distribution of the 81 countries into cultural regions.

that measures favoring democracy has been rejected precisely because of the high consensus on supporting that kind of government in all countries. Instead, favoring a government based on a strong leader has been preferred for three reasons: it shows greater variation; it is highly correlated with preference for army rule (.36) and experts making decisions (.31); and it is the indicator that is more ighly (and negatively) correlated with favoring democracy (-.21). Women need children was the only indicator on attitudes towards the present social role of women, and therefore was selected.

A test that provides reassurance on the selection of these indicators was its relationship with the indicator that supposedly measures the change of values, that is, Inglehart's four items scale on post-materialism (Inglehart 1977, 1990, 1997; Díez-Nicolás 2000). The indicator (difference between the percent of respondents who show post-materialist values and the percent who show materialist values, disregarding the central category of mixed values) shows high and statistically significant (.000 level) correlations with life satisfaction (.14), interpersonal trust (.07), importance of God in one's life (-.08), women need children (-.19) and favoring strong leadership (-.10). It may be added that its relationship to favoring democracy is the same (but of opposite sign) that to favoring strong leadership. All relationships were in the expected direction.

Regional comparisons on the selected five attitudinal indicators seem to mask, once more, very high within-region differences, even higher than between region differences, as may be seen in some examples reported in Table 2. Thus, the ratios between the highest and the lowest values of regions in four selected attitudinal indicators have been compared with the ratios obtained between the highest and lowest values of countries within each region. Since Huntington has placed a great emphasis on religion as one of the most important basis for confrontation between "the West" and Islam, it may be interesting to underline that, though Islamic countries show an average of 9 points on a scale 0 to 10 points, the same importance is also attached to God in one's life in Latin American and African sub-Saharan societies, though they do not seem to be labeled "fundamentalists." Besides, the average for that item is 8.5 in the U.S., 9.2 in Malta, 8.4 in Poland, 8.6 in Romania, 9.6 in the Philippines, and over 9.0 in all African sub-Saharan and most Latin American countries, though that doesn't seem to worry.

The data provides further evidence to question Huntington's assumptions of internal homogeneity of "civilizations" or "cultural regions" and external differentiation with respect to other regions. The importance of God in one's life within the Anglo-Saxon group, for example, varies from 8.5 in the U.S. to 4.9 in Britain, while citizens of Islamic, African sub-Saharan, and Latin American countries attribute an equal importance to God in their lives.

**Table 2**

Between-regions and within-regions ratios of the highest over the lowest value of some attitudinal indicators, 1995-2000\*

	Ratios of Highest to Lowest Values in:			
	Life satisfaction	Freedom of choice and own life's control	Importance of God in one's life	Difference of % post-materialist and materialist
Between regions (highest/lowest):	<b>1.6</b>	<b>1.4</b>	<b>1.9</b>	<b>2.0</b>
Within regions (between countries, highest/lowest)				
Anglo Saxon	1.1	1.1	1.7	1.1
West European Catholic	1.2	1.2	2.1	1.7
West European Protestant	1.1	1.1	1.8	1.4
East European Christian	1.4	1.2	2.7	2.0
European Orthodox	1.7	1.4	1.7	1.9
Latin American	1.3	1.2	1.4	1.4
Islamic	1.5	1.6	1.4	2.2
Sinic-Confucian	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.5
African sub-Saharan	1.8	1.2	1.1	1.2

\* Japan and India, two countries that are treated as single-country cultural regions, are not included here because they have no within-region differences. The "Others" category (that includes the Philippines and Israel) are also excluded because they do not constitute a region.

At this point it seemed necessary to verify whether or not the concept of civilization or world region is a good predictor of values, and to establish what is its explanatory value in comparison with other potential explanatory variables. To this effect a regression (OLS) model was constructed in such a way that its results could be easily compared with those found by Norris and Inglehart (2002) in their comparison of the West and Islam, where they conclude that these two regions differ more regarding issues that relate to gender equality and sexual liberalization than to issues concerning democracy.

The five indicators previously selected were taken as dependent variables, and the same explanatory variables were included in the five regression models. Similarly to Norris and Inglehart, some macro-variables (contextual, societal) seemed necessary, and the three that were discussed in the first part of these paper were selected, that is, GNP per capita, Human Development Index and Freedom House Ratings, to measure the levels of economic, social well-being and democratic development. The high correlations among the three indicators, and of each one of them with the average post-materialist measure (four items scale) for each country and region have already been reported and commented. It must be noted that Norris and Inglehart did not include in their model GNP per capita as one of their development control variables, in spite of the fact that Inglehart has repeatedly shown its very high relationship with value change.

Another group of control variables at the micro-level include gender, age, educational level attained, family income and religiosity.<sup>†</sup> These five variables were also included in Norris and Inglehart's comparative analysis of the West and Islam.

Finally, the type of societies variable includes the twelve groups of countries that have been already defined. The main difference with respect to Norris and Inglehart's grouping is that Anglo-Saxon countries have been considered separately from the West, on the assumption that they differ significantly especially with respect to religious beliefs and practice. Besides, West European countries have been divided into those that are predominantly protestant or catholic. On this same line, the dummy variable for type of society was the Anglo-Saxon countries, instead of the West European.

The full regression model for the five dependent variables is presented in Table 3. But the effect of each group of explanatory or control variables

---

<sup>†</sup>Gender was measured through the proportion of female respondents as dummy variable, males being the omitted category. Age was measured in single years. Education was measured through a nine points scale (1 = low, 9 = high). Family income was measured through a ten deciles scale (1 = low, 10 = high), and religiosity was measured through a five points scale (1 = low, 5 = high).

**Table 3**  
Explanation of Social and Political Values by groups of control variables\*

	Satisfaction with life				Interpersonal Trust				Importance of God				Women need children				Favor Strong Leader			
	B	St. Err.	Beta	Sig.	B	St. Err.	Beta	Sig.	B	St. Err.	Beta	Sig.	B	St. Err.	Beta	Sig.	B	St. Err.	Beta	Sig.
<b>Developmental variables:</b>																				
GNP per capita	.0	.00	.18	.000	.0	.00	.09	.000	-.0	.00	-.14	.000	-.0	.00	-.05	.000	-.0	.00	-.21	.000
Human Development Index	1.4	.17	.07	.000	.0	.03	.02	.068	.3	.17	.01	.122	-1.0	.03	-.27	.000	1.4	.07	.18	.000
Freedom House Ratings	-.0	.00	-.06	.000	.0	.00	-.13	.000	.0	.01	.01	.133	.0	.00	.12	.000	-.0	.00	-.04	.000
<b>Socio-demographic variables</b>																				
Sex (female)	.0	.02	.01	.001	.0	.00	-.01	.006	.6	.02	.09	.000	-.0	.00	-.01	.064	-.0	.01	-.00	.215
Age	-.0	.00	-.02	.000	.0	.00	.03	.000	.0	.00	.04	.000	.0	.00	.09	.000	-.0	.00	-.01	.000
Education	.0	.00	.02	.000	.0	.00	.04	.000	-.0	.00	-.02	.000	-.0	.00	-.07	.000	-.0	.00	-.08	.000
Religious practice	.1	.01	.06	.000	.0	.00	.02	.000	.8	.01	.40	.000	.0	.00	.04	.000	.0	.00	.01	.003
Family income	.2	.00	.16	.000	.0	.00	.08	.000	-.0	.00	-.05	.000	-.0	.00	-.03	.000	-.0	.00	-.08	.000
<b>Type of Society 1:</b>																				
West European Catholic	.0	.04	.00	.944	-.0	.01	-.06	.000	-.3	.04	-.03	.000	.2	.01	.16	.000	-.0	.02	-.00	.379
West European Protestant	.3	.04	.03	.000	.2	.01	.09	.000	-1.1	.04	-.08	.000	.2	.01	.08	.000	-.2	.02	-.05	.000
East European Christian	-.3	.05	-.04	.000	.1	.01	.07	.000	1.4	.05	-.14	.000	.3	.01	.21	.000	-.2	.02	-.05	.000
Orthodox European	-1.7	.06	-.22	.000	-.14	.01	-.11	.000	-.6	.06	-.07	.000	.5	.01	.34	.000	.4	.02	.13	.000
Latin American	1.0	.05	.14	.000	-.2	.01	-.18	.000	1.2	.05	.13	.000	.2	.01	.15	.000	.3	.02	.10	.000

\* Variables are defined in notes 3, 4 and 5. The omitted variable in Type of Society is Anglo-Saxon countries. All  $R^2$  are significant at .000.

**Table 3**  
(Continued)

	Satisfaction with life				Interpersonal Trust				Importance of God				Women need children				Favor Strong Leader			
	B	St. Err.	Beta	Sig.	B	St. Err.	Beta	Sig.	B	St. Err.	Beta	Sig.	B	St. Err.	Beta	Sig.	B	St. Err.	Beta	Sig.
<b>Type of Society 1:</b>																				
Islamic	-.7	.06	-.10	.000	-.0	.01	-.06	.000	1.3	.06	-.17	.000	.4	.01	.34	.000	-.0	.02	-.02	.036
Sinic-Confucian	-.4	.06	-.02	.000	-.0	.01	-.01	.022	-1.8	.07	-.09	.000	.5	.01	.17	.000	.6	.03	.10	.000
Japan	-1.1	.07	-.05	.000	.0	.01	.01	.025	-1.7	.08	-.06	.000	.5	.02	.09	.000	.0	.03	.01	.014
India	-.7	.08	-.04	.000	.1	.02	.04	.000	-.9	.08	-.04	.000	.2	.02	.08	.000	.8	.04	.10	.000
Sub-Saharan African	-.6	.07	-.06	.000	-.2	.01	-.12	.000	.5	.07	.04	.000	.2	.01	.08	.000	.0	.03	.01	.214
Others	-.2	.09	-.01	.090	-.2	.02	-.06	.000	.7	.09	.03	.000	.5	.02	.11	.000	.6	.04	.06	.000
(Constant)	4.5				1.3				5.1				1.9				1.7			
<b>Adj. R<sup>2</sup></b> <b>(developmental var.)</b>			<b>.09</b>				<b>.03</b>				<b>.17</b>				<b>.13</b>				<b>.05</b>	
<b>Adj. R<sup>2</sup></b> <b>(socio-demogra. var.)</b>			<b>.04</b>				<b>.02</b>				<b>.31</b>				<b>.04</b>				<b>.02</b>	
<b>Adj. R<sup>2</sup></b> <b>(type of society var.)</b>			<b>.16</b>				<b>.05</b>				<b>.27</b>				<b>.16</b>				<b>.08</b>	
<b>Adj. R<sup>2</sup></b> <b>(control var. only)</b>			<b>.13</b>				<b>.05</b>				<b>.36</b>				<b>.16</b>				<b>.07</b>	
<b>Adj. R<sup>2</sup></b> <b>(control var. + type)</b>			<b>.20</b>				<b>.08</b>				<b>.44</b>				<b>.21</b>				<b>.11</b>	

has been calculated separately and jointly. Thus, it may be noticed that the type of society explains by itself a greater degree of the variance in life satisfaction, interpersonal trust, women need children and strong leadership than the macro- or micro-level control variables, but the socio-demographic variables explain a greater degree of the variance of the importance of God in one's life. Obviously, this is due to the contribution of religious practice (its individual standardized regression coefficient is .40) among the socio-demographic independent variables. But it must be also remarked that the development variables (GNP, HDI and FHR) explain almost as much a proportion of the variance on each of the five dependent variables as the type of society. As a matter of fact, GNP per capita contributes more to the explanation of life satisfaction, importance of God and favoring strong leadership than the other two development variables, and it is certainly one of two or three variables, of all the variables in the model, that contributes more to the explanation of the variance in any of the five dependent variables. At the individual level, family income is also the socio-demographic variable that contributes more to the explanation of life satisfaction, interpersonal trust and (negatively) to strong leadership. The relationship between the development variables and type of society is very high, for which reason the additional contribution of socio-demographic variables to the total adjusted  $R^2$  is never higher than .02. The same result is true if religion is included as another micro-level (individual) variable (using seven categories and catholic as the dummy variable for comparison of results. Its additional contribution to the total  $R^2$  is usually none or .01, probably because predominant country religion has been used as one of the criteria to define types of society. It seems, therefore, that individual socio-demographic variables, including one's religion, make a smaller contribution to the explanation of life satisfaction, interpersonal trust, importance of God in one's life, attitude towards women being in need of having children, and rejection of strong leadership as an acceptable form of government, when type of society and three macro-level measures of economic, social and political development are controlled. These results confirm very strongly the findings of Norris and Inglehart using a very similar model, though they do not compare the separate contribution of macro- and micro- control variables. It must be added, nevertheless, that when their regression models are used (that is, removing GNP per capita, collapsing Anglo-Saxon, West European Protestant and West European Catholic into a West category, and using this as the omitted variable, and removing Japan and India as separate categories, including them in the Other category), the total  $R^2$  for each of the five dependent variable changes very little or not at all. More specifically, it doesn't change at all with respect to life satisfaction, it

loses .01 with respect to importance of God in one's life, agreement that women need to have children and with favoring strong leadership, and it diminishes .02 with respect to interpersonal trust.

Norris and Inglehart's model, however, was intended to compare mainly the West and Islam with respect to political attitudes and attitudes towards gender equality and sexual liberalization. The model presented here was intended to verify the hypothesis that Huntington's classification of societies into seven civilizations is an artifact, and that country differences within the said civilizations may be very significant. While it is true that Norris and Inglehart find significant differences between the West and Islam, the results of the analysis presented here demonstrates that Anglo-Saxon countries differ significantly from West European Protestant and West European Catholic countries (and also from other groups of countries). More specifically, the data demonstrate that citizens of Anglo-Saxon countries, once three development variables and five socio-demographic variables are controlled, are significantly less satisfied with life, show lower interpersonal trust, give more importance to God in their lives, agree less with the idea that women need to have children, and support strong leadership more than citizens of West European Protestant countries. Besides, they show significant more interpersonal trust, they give more importance to God in their lives, and they agree less in the need of women to have children than citizens of West European Catholic countries. The West is not an homogeneous entity, as well as other groupings of countries are not either. And the results seem to be consistent with five different dimensions of attitudes. It seems to be true that the country of residence of individuals (and not necessarily the world region) continues to be the best predictor of individual's attitudes in international comparative research (Deflen & Pampel 1996).

It seems appropriate to underline the fact that citizens in Anglo-Saxon countries give a greater importance to God in their lives than citizens of countries that have been here labeled as West European Protestant and Catholic, East European Christian, European Orthodox, Sinic-Confucian, Japan, and India. They attribute less importance to God only when compared with citizens of Latin America, Islam and African sub-Saharan countries, and also less than citizens of the Philippines and Israel. The clash of civilizations that Huntington foresees seems to be dependent not only on the presumed religious fundamentalism of individuals in Islamic countries. If the clash is going to occur at all, it will probably depend on other more important variables, and maybe on the religious fundamentalism of other countries and religions.

Nevertheless, the data suggest that the three groups of control variables that have been used in this analysis explain almost half of the variance

in the importance given to God by individuals around the world, much more than they explain in the other four dependent variables. One might be led to believe that this is due to the inclusion of religious practice among the socio-demographic variables. But when this variable is removed from the regression model the total  $R^2$  is reduced from .44 to only .31, a proportion that, nevertheless, is still double than the variance explained for life satisfaction and the agreement with the need of women to have children.

### **The Importance of the Social Context**

A final argument to refute the "clash of civilizations" hypothesis refers to effect of geographical mobility, and more specifically of international migration, in the attitudes and value system of people. Data from a sample survey among immigrants into Spain carried out in November 2001 (Díez-Nicolás & Ramírez-Lafita, forthcoming) provide the opportunity to compare them with the populations of their world region of origin and with the receiving Spanish population with respect to certain items of the WVS-EVS surveys that have been analyzed above. The three main groups of immigrants into Spain come from Latin America, Arab-Islamic countries (and more specifically from Morocco) and from sub-Saharan Africa. East European immigrants are more recent and smaller in numbers, though growing (Díez-Nicolás & Ramírez-Lafita 2001a). A first survey was conducted in 2000 (Díez-Nicolás & Ramírez-Lafita 2001b), but only in the 2001 wave were some WVS questions included in the questionnaire. Both surveys were conducted with 250 immigrants in each of the five regions of Spain having the largest number of immigrants (Madrid, Cataluña, Valencia, Andalucía and Canary Islands), and in each region the four main groups of immigrants (grouped according to region of origin) were proportionally represented in the sample. For this paper only the three main groups, representing more than 80% of the total sample, have been selected: Latin Americans, Islamic-Arabs (the great majority of them Moroccans) and sub-Saharan Africans.

The main hypothesis to test was that immigrants tend to adopt the values of the receiving society as an instrumental response to facilitate their social integration. An annual survey on the attitudes of Spaniards towards immigrants has shown that they favor the integration of Latin Americans more than that of any other group of immigrants, though they express their desire for all groups to integrate into Spanish society. They also believe that Latin American immigrants are more capable of integration, that they show a greater interest in integrating themselves, and that they acknowledge to have achieved integration more fully than other groups of immigrants (Díez-Nicolás & Ramírez-Lafita 2001a). The

first survey conducted among migrants in 2000 showed that migrants themselves perceived Latin Americans as the group with more facilities and interest to be integrated into Spanish society and as the group that had achieved integration more fully (Diez-Nicolás & Ramírez-Lafita 2001b). A comparison of attitudes of migrants and Spaniards with respect to migration policies and problems has shown a greater degree of coincidence than expected, as the surveys conducted in 2001 have confirmed (Diez-Nicolás 2002).

On the basis of these results, it was expected that Latin American immigrants would exhibit attitudes and values closer to the receiving Spanish population, while sub-Saharan Africans were expected to differ more from Spaniards, with Islamic-Arabs more or less on the middle. And it was further hypothesized that all three groups of immigrants would exhibit attitudes and values that were closer to those of Spaniards than to those of the populations of the world region from which they came.

The first hypothesis seems to be confirmed for the most part. In all but two of the eleven comparisons that may be made with the data in Table 4 attitudes of Latin American immigrants are closer to those of Spaniards than attitudes of Islamic-Arab or sub-Saharan African immigrants. The two exceptions refer to interpersonal trust, lower among Spaniards than among Latin American and Islamic-Arab immigrants, and to rejection of army rule, an option rejected by Islamic-Arab immigrants in lower but closer proportion to Spaniards, equally rejected by sub-Saharan African immigrants, and slightly more rejected by Latin American immigrants, probably because a significant proportion of them migrated to Spain to escape from military rule in their countries of origin. However, in five out of the eleven comparisons sub-Saharan African migrants are closer to Spaniards than Islamic-Arab immigrants. This is especially the case with respect to the two religious items, the agreement on the need of women to have children (very much related to religious beliefs), and to favoring the army rule, and it suggests that Islamic-Arab immigrants (mainly Moroccans) tend to maintain their original cultural values, especially those that refer to religion, more strongly than sub-Saharan African immigrants, who come from a greater variety of countries and a less homogeneous culture.

As for the second hypothesis, it is clear that Latin American immigrants' attitudes are closer to those of Spaniards than to the Latin American populations from which they come in nine of the eleven items that have been compared in Table 4. The comparison is more complex when it refers to Islamic-Arab immigrants and Spaniards. They are closer to Spaniards with respect to the political items, but they are closer to their populations of origin with respect to religious and family (influenced by religion) items.

**Table 4**

Comparison of some attitudinal indicators among Immigrants into Spain by region of origin, and Nationals of the same regions of origin and Nationals of Spain, 1995-2000\*

	<b>Spain</b>	Latin American Immigrants	Latin American Nationals	Islamic Immigrants	Moroccans	Islamic Nationals	African sub-Saharan Immigrants	African sub-Saharan Nationals
	N= <b>(1,209)</b>	(261)	(16,027)	(238)	(1,251)	(21,193)	(117)	(8,197)
<b>Personal Well-Being:</b>								
Satisfaction with life (mean on scale 0-10)	<b>6.98</b>	6.72	7.71	5.41	5.36	5.80	5.17	5.55
% Very Happy	<b>20</b>	14	33	7	22	20	11	44
<b>Social Capital:</b>								
% Most people can be Trusted	<b>33</b>	40	14	37	22	29	33	14
Freedom of choice and Control of one's life (mean on scale 0-10)	<b>6.72</b>	7.03	7.66	5.48	6.13	5.92	5.42	6.60
<b>Religiosity:</b>								
Importance of God in one's life (mean on scale 0-10)	<b>5.83</b>	6.93	9.12	7.74	9.93	9.45	7.03	9.38
% Get Comfort in Religion	<b>52</b>	63	60	90	99	91	85	92
<b>Role of Women:</b>								
% Women need Children	<b>45</b>	42	41	69	72	78	42	66
<b>Political Attitudes:</b>								
% Strong leader is good or very good	<b>16</b>	11	44	21	13	27	10	28
% Government of Experts is good or very good	<b>28</b>	29	59	26	51	47	15	50
% Army rule is good or very good	<b>6</b>	2	25	9	10	27	4	21
% Democratic system is good or very good	<b>87</b>	86	83	65	69	82	51	87

\* Countries included in Latin American, Islamic and African sub-Saharan countries are defined in note 4. Data for immigrants come from ASEP Data Archive, and are part of a survey conducted with a sample of 750 immigrants in Spain in November 2001. Data for Spain and Morocco are part of the 2000 WVS survey as described in notes 2 and 3.

However, it must be underlined that even though Islamic-Arab immigrants seem to be closer to the values of their populations of origin in most items, they show a clear divergence in some of them (even religious items), approaching the values of Spaniards. On the other hand, since most Islamic-Arab immigrants come from Morocco, it has been possible to compare their attitudes with those of the Moroccan sample in the 2000 WVS wave in Table 4. This comparison suggests that Islamic-Arab immigrants (mainly Moroccans) diverge more from Moroccans than from the Islamic populations in the WVS surveys with respect to all but four items. This divergence is especially notable with the two religious items (to the point that they are closer to Spaniards than to Moroccans in the importance attached to God in their lives) and with respect to the rejection of a government based on a strong leader or experts, but immigrants seem to be closer to Moroccans with respect to their favoring the a democratic political system (and in their small support to army rule). As for the sub-Saharan African immigrants, their attitudes are closer to those of Spaniards in all but three of the eleven comparisons.

It must be also remarked that the three groups of immigrants are significantly less satisfied with their lives and less happy than their counterparts in their regions of origin and than Spaniards. This is easy to understand, inasmuch as migration produces a lot of strain and sacrifice, and even if in the long run migrants attain a better standard of living than in their country of origin, it always produces in the individual a sense of unhappiness for having been forced by circumstances to abandon their original family, social and cultural environment. Besides, perhaps because of comparisons with their country of origin, they show greater interpersonal trust not only than their fellow countrymen in their regions of origin, but even a little more than Spaniards in the case of Latin American and Islamic-Arab immigrants. Finally, it may be observed that immigrants tend to be closer to their cultural origins with respect to religious and family attitudes, though even in this case there is a clear change towards the attitudes of the Spanish receiving population, but they are already closer to Spaniards' attitudes with respect to political issues, and very significantly so with respect to their rejection of a government based on a strong leader that doesn't have to care about a Parliament.

A regression OLS model (see Table 5) has also been used with the same selected five dependent variables that have been used to compare world regions above.<sup>5</sup> In this case, the three development control variables have been omitted, since it would be difficult to measure their influence

---

<sup>5</sup>The only differences with respect to the socio-demographic variables used for comparing world regions refer to education, measured in this case through a seven points

on immigrants' attitudes, because those of the receiving country would be constant and those of the regions of origin would have the same values for immigrants from each region and the nationals from the same region. The groups that have been compared are, therefore, the three groups of immigrants and the three regions from which they come as dummy variables, plus the residual category of other immigrants and other nationals. Spain has been the omitted variable for comparison.

It may be noticed that socio-demographic variables explain almost as much of the total variance in each of the five selected values variables than the type of society variable, and in the case of the importance of God in one's life, even more. The explanation is the same that the one offered before, the inclusion, among the socio-demographic variable, of an item measuring religious practice, that by itself has the greatest contribution (.42) to the total explained variance. The important conclusions to derive from these analysis, however, are that, when gender, age, education, religious practice and family income are controlled, all immigrants and nationals (except Latin American) are significantly less satisfied with their lives than Spaniards, a finding that is coherent with the high positive relationship mentioned above between the three development variables and life satisfaction. All immigrant groups exhibit a significantly higher interpersonal trust than Spaniards, while Spaniards show significant more interpersonal trust than Latin American and sub-Saharan African nationals (though this difference is not significant with respect to Islamic nationals). All immigrant and national groups give significant greater importance to God than Spaniards (except sub-Saharan African and other immigrants). Islamic-Arab and other immigrants, as well as all national groups, show a higher agreement with the statement that women need children than Spaniards, though the opposite seems to be true with respect to sub-Saharan African immigrants. And Latin American and other immigrants are less supportive of a government based on a strong leader than the receiving Spanish population, though Spaniards are less favorable to strong leadership than the nationals of Latin America and Islamic countries.

Finally, in Table 6, immigrants (as the omitted variable in each of the three regression OLS models) have been compared with Spaniards and nationals (as dummy variables) to test the significance of their differences when the same set of socio-demographic variables are controlled. It seems possible to conclude that Latin American immigrants are less satisfied with life than their counterparts in Latin America and than Spaniards, they agree more with women being in need of having children than their

---

scale (1 = low, 7 = high) and age, measured through age groups (1 = 18-29 years; 2 = 30-49 years; 3 = 50-64 years; and 4 = 65 years and over).

**Table 5**

Explanation of Social and Political Values by groups of control variables, Immigrants into Spain and Nationals from three World Regions\*

	Satisfaction with life				Interpersonal Trust				Importance of God			Women need children			Favor Strong Leader					
	B	St. Err.	Beta	Sig.	B	St. Err.	Beta	Sig.	B	St. Err.	Beta	Sig.	B	St. Err.	Beta	Sig.				
<b>Socio-demographic variables</b>																				
Sex (female)	.0	.02	.01	.000	.0	.00	-.01	.000	.6	.02	.09	.000	-.0	.00	-.02	.000	-.0	.01	-.01	.044
Age	.0	.01	.00	.263	.0	.00	.02	.000	.0	.01	.03	.000	.0	.00	.06	.000	-.0	.00	-.03	.000
Education	.0	.01	.01	.054	.0	.00	.02	.000	-.0	.01	-.03	.000	-.0	.00	-.09	.000	-.0	.00	-.07	.000
Religious practice	.0	.01	.04	.000	.0	.00	.00	.175	.9	.01	.42	.000	.0	.00	.08	.000	.0	.00	.03	.000
Family income	.2	.00	.19	.000	.0	.00	.10	.000	-.0	.00	-.05	.000	-.0	.00	-.05	.000	-.0	.00	-.09	.000
<b>Type of Society 1:</b>																				
Latin American Immigrants	.0	.24	.00	.739	.1	.04	.01	.001	1.4	.23	.02	.000	-.0	.05	-.00	.287	-.3	.11	-.01	.008
Islamic Immigrants	-1.2	.23	-.02	.000	.1	.04	.01	.002	.8	.22	.01	.000	.1	.04	.01	.006	-.1	.11	-.00	.288
African sub-Saharan Immigrants	-1.6	.30	-.02	.000	.3	.06	.02	.000	.2	.29	.00	.531	-.2	.06	-.01	.007	-.2	.17	-.00	.319
Other Immigrants	-.6	.29	-.01	.047	.2	.05	.01	.000	-.0	.28	.00	.976	.1	.06	.01	.013	.4	.13	-.01	.005
Latin American Nationals	.7	.09	.10	.000	-.2	.02	-.15	.000	2.9	.08	.31	.000	.0	.02	.02	.125	.44	.04	.16	.000
Islamic Nationals	1.2	.09	-.18	.000	-.0	.02	-.01	.465	3.1	.08	.40	.000	.3	.02	.25	.000	.0	.04	.03	.036
African sub-Saharan Nationals	-1.3	.09	-.12	.000	-.2	.02	-.10	.000	2.2	.09	.19	.000	.2	.02	.09	.000	.0	.04	.00	.795
Other Nationals	-.5	.09	-.10	.000	-.0	.02	-.02	.233	.7	.08	.11	.000	.0	.02	.10	.000	.2	.04	.09	.000
(Constant)	5.8				1.2				3.3				1.5				2.4			
<b>Adj. R<sup>2</sup>(socio-demogra. var.)</b>			<b>.04</b>				<b>.02</b>				<b>.31</b>				<b>.04</b>				<b>.02</b>	
<b>Adj. R<sup>2</sup>(type of society var.)</b>			<b>.05</b>				<b>.02</b>				<b>.24</b>				<b>.04</b>				<b>.02</b>	
<b>Adj. R<sup>2</sup>(socio-demogra.+type)</b>			<b>.09</b>				<b>.04</b>				<b>.41</b>				<b>.07</b>				<b>.03</b>	

\* See end notes 4 and 6 for definition of variables. The omitted variable in the regression OLS model for Type of Society is Spain. All R<sup>2</sup> are significant at .000.

Table 6

Explanation of Social and Political Values by groups of control variables, Immigrants into Spain and Nationals from three World Regions\*

	Satisfaction with life				Interpersonal Trust				Importance of God				Women need children				Favor Strong Leader			
	B	St.Err.	Beta	Sig.	B	St.Err.	Beta	Sig.	B	St.Err.	Beta	Sig.	B	St.Err.	Beta	Sig.	B	St.Err.	Beta	Sig.
<b>Socio-demographic variables</b>																				
Sex (female)	.0	.02	.02	.000	-.0	.00	-.01	.002	.5	.02	.07	.000	-.0	.00	-.02	.000	-.0	.01	-.00	.292
Age	.0	.01	.03	.000	.0	.00	.03	.000	-.1	.01	-.04	.000	.0	.00	.03	.000	-.0	.00	-.02	.000
Education	.0	.01	.03	.000	.0	.00	.03	.000	-.2	.01	-.08	.000	-.0	.00	-.11	.000	-.0	.00	-.06	.000
Religious practice	.0	.01	.00	.187	-.0	.00	-.02	.000	1.1	.01	.51	.000	.0	.00	.12	.000	.0	.00	.01	.081
Family income	.2	.00	.19	.000	.0	.00	.10	.000	-.0	.00	-.06	.000	-.0	.00	-.06	.000	-.0	.01	-.09	.000
<b>Latin Americans</b>																				
Nationals	1.5	.02	.21	.000	-.2	.00	-.12	.000	1.4	.02	.15	.000	-.14	.00	-.09	.000	.32	.01	.11	.000
Spaniards	.8	.09	.03	.000	.0	.02	.01	.064	-1.4	.09	-.04	.000	-.16	.02	-.03	.000	-.15	.04	-.01	.000
(Constant)	4.8				1.2				5.2				1.7				2.5			
<b>Adj. R<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>.08</b>				<b>.03</b>				<b>.33</b>				<b>.05</b>				<b>.03</b>			
<b>Socio-demographic variables</b>																				
Sex (female)	.0	.02	.01	.000	-.0	.00	-.01	.020	.5	.02	.08	.000	-.0	.00	-.02	.000	-.0	.01	-.01	.091
Age	-.0	.01	-.01	.010	.0	.00	.05	.000	-.0	.01	-.02	.000	.0	.00	.06	.000	-.0	.00	-.04	.000
Education	.0	.01	.00	.114	.0	.00	.04	.000	-.0	.01	-.04	.000	-.0	.00	-.09	.000	-.0	.00	-.07	.000
Religious practice	.0	.01	.04	.000	-.0	.00	-.04	.000	1.0	.01	.49	.000	.0	.00	.08	.000	.0	.00	.02	.000
Family income	.2	.00	.18	.000	.0	.00	.10	.000	-.0	.00	-.06	.000	-.0	.00	-.05	.000	-.0	.00	-.09	.000
<b>Islamic</b>																				
Nationals	-.9	.02	-.13	.000	.0	.00	.06	.000	1.8	.02	.23	.000	.2	.00	.17	.000	-.1	.01	-.05	.000
Spaniards	.4	.09	.01	.000	.0	.02	.01	.000	-1.2	.09	-.04	.000	-.0	.02	-.02	.000	-.2	.04	-.02	.000
(Constant)	5.5				1.1				4.6				1.6				2.6			
<b>Adj. R<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>.05</b>				<b>.02</b>				<b>.36</b>				<b>.07</b>				<b>.02</b>			

**Table 6**  
(Continued)

	Satisfaction with life				Interpersonal Trust				Importance of God				Women need children				Favor Strong Leader			
	B	St. Err.	Beta	Sig.	B	St. Err.	Beta	Sig.	B	St. Err.	Beta	Sig.	B	St. Err.	Beta	Sig.	B	St. Err.	Beta	Sig.
<b>Socio-demographic variables</b>																				
Sex (female)	.0	.02	.01	.000	-.0	.00	-.01	.000	.5	.02	.07	.000	-.0	.00	-.02	.000	-.0	.01	-.00	.108
Age	.0	.01	.00	.606	.0	.00	.04	.000	-.2	.01	-.05	.000	.0	.00	.04	.000	-.0	.00	-.03	.000
Education	.0	.01	.02	.000	.0	.00	.02	.000	-.2	.01	-.07	.000	-.0	.00	-.12	.000	-.0	.00	-.06	.000
Religious practice	.0	.01	.05	.000	-.0	.00	-.01	.000	1.1	.01	.52	.000	.0	.00	.10	.000	.0	.00	.03	.000
Family income	.2	.00	.18	.000	.0	.00	.10	.000	-.0	.00	-.06	.000	-.0	.00	-.05	.000	-.0	.00	-.09	.000
<b>Africans sub-Sahara</b>																				
Nationals	-.8	.03	-.08	.000	-.1	.01	-.07	.000	.2	.03	.02	.000	.0	.01	.01	.045	-.2	.01	-.05	.000
Spaniards	.5	.09	.02	.000	.0	.02	.01	.006	-1.6	.09	-.05	.000	-.1	.02	-.03	.000	-.2	.04	-.02	.000
(Constant)	5.2				1.2				5.3				1.7				2.6			
<b>Adj. R<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>.04</b>				<b>.02</b>				<b>.31</b>				<b>.04</b>				<b>.02</b>			

\* See notes 4 and 6 for definition of variables. The omitted variables in each of the three regression OLS models are the Immigrants from Latin America, Islamic countries and African sub-Saharan countries respectively. All R<sup>2</sup> are significant at .000.

national counterparts and Spaniards, they show higher interpersonal trust, give more importance to God, and favor less strong leadership than their national counterparts, but they give less importance to God and favor strong leadership significantly more than Spaniards.

Islamic-Arab (mainly Moroccans) are more satisfied with their life, and favor more strong leadership than their national counterparts, though they show less interpersonal trust, less agreement with women being in need of having children and give less importance to God than Islamic populations. In comparison with Spaniards, they are less satisfied with life, they show less interpersonal trust and they give more importance to God in their lives, agree more with women being in need of having children and support more strong leadership.

And finally, sub-Saharan African immigrants are more satisfied with life and show more interpersonal trust, but give less importance to God in their lives and favor more strong leadership than their national counterparts, and they are less satisfied with life and show less interpersonal trust, but give more importance to God, agree more with the need of women to have children, and support more strong leadership, than Spaniards.

Therefore, on the basis of available data, the two hypotheses regarding the change of their values cannot be rejected, that is, that immigrants tend to adopt the values of the receiving population, in this case the Spanish population, at the same time that they diverge from the values of their original populations, and that Latin American immigrants, because of greater facilities for integration due to common language, religion and culture, adopt the values of Spaniards more fully than immigrants of Islamic or sub-Saharan African origin. Besides, the evidence seems to support the conclusion that adoption of new values is easier with respect to political-democratic values and slower, but showing intensive and significant change, with respect to religious values. This finding suggests that communication, especially interpersonal communication, may facilitate the knowledge, and consequently the adoption, of new postmodern values by the populations of more traditional societies. But this conclusion contests, once more, Huntington's views of civilizations or cultures as internally homogeneous and externally predetermined to "clash."

### **Summary of Results**

This paper has attempted to present empirical evidence to refute Fukuyama's thesis of the end of history and Huntington's thesis of the "clash" of civilizations. The data that have been presented and analyzed above support the initial hypotheses that, at the macro-level, there is a strong positive relationship between economic, political, social and cul-

tural development, as measured by GNP per capita, Freedom House Ratings, Human Development Index and post-materialist values. However, this strong relationship is compatible with the observation of very large and even increasing inequalities with respect to the level of development reached by countries and world regions in each of the mentioned dimensions. Even though free market economy and parliamentary democracy seem to be the only economic and political models at present for all societies, countries are far from having reached the same level of development in their economic, their social well-being, their civic liberties and their value systems. Consequently, the world seems to be far away from the end of history.

Furthermore, the evidence seems to confirm that within-world regions variation may be larger than between-world regions in the four mentioned dimensions, and that the concept of "civilization" or "world region" as an homogeneous entity cannot be accepted uncritically. Thus, the West has been divided into Anglo-Saxon, West European Catholic and West European Protestant blocks for analytical purposes, and the data have clearly shown significant differences between Anglo-Saxon countries and West European countries. Probably similar findings could be obtained for other presumed homogeneous world regions. The country seems to be still a better unit of analysis for explaining individual attitudes in international comparative research.

Nevertheless, the types of society defined as world cultural regions seem to have a significant explanatory power at the micro-level, that is, for individuals' attitudes, greater than the block of development and the block of individual socio-demographic control variables. But socio-economic differences among world regions (especially GNP differences) may explain differences in values in a similar and sometimes even greater degree than types of society or "civilizations" as Huntington defines them. And, at the micro-level, family income also seems to be the variable with greater explanatory power of individuals' attitudes. The internal homogeneity of "civilizations" is therefore questioned by empirical evidence.

Finally, regarding the effect of migration on changing people's values, it seems that migrants tend to adopt the values of the receiving society as an instrumental response to better adapt to their new social environment. This change is evident when comparing three groups of migrants into Spain (Latin American, Islamic-Arab and sub-Sahara African) on the basis of their attitudes to five different dimensions, both with respect to Spaniards and to nationals from their world regions of origin. Though the change is significant in all observed dimensions, it seems to be faster regarding political attitudes than regarding religious and family or related attitudes. And the change seems to be more fully accomplished among

Latin American immigrants than among Islamic or sub-Saharan African immigrants, as expected.

## References

- BECK, U.  
1999 *World Risk Society*. New York: Blackwell Publishers.
- COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
1980 *The Global 2000 Report to the President*. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office.
- DIEZ-NICOLÁS, J.  
1980 "La España Previsible." *Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas*, 12.  
1982 "Ecología Humana y Ecosistema Social" in CEOTMA, *Sociología y Medio Ambiente*. Madrid: MOPU.  
1995 "Postmaterialism and the social ecosystem" in Beat y Beatrix Sitter Liver (eds.), *Culture within nature*. Paris: UNESCO.  
1999 "Industrialization and Concern for the Environment" en N. Tos, P. Ph. Mohler y B. Malnar (eds.), *Modern Society and Values*. Ljubljana: FSS y Mannheim: ZUMA. (Traducción al español en F. Cruz Beltrán y E. Gualda Caballero (comps.), Huelva: *Medio Ambiente y Sociedad*, Huelva: Universidad de Huelva.)  
2000 "La Escala de Postmaterialismo como Medida del Cambio de Valores en las Sociedades Contemporáneas" en F. Andrés Orizo y J. Elzo, *España 2000, entre el Localismo y la Globalidad*. Madrid: Editorial SM.  
2001 "Social Values, Social Change and Social Integration." Paper presented at the Fourth International Forum on Urban Poverty (IFUP), Marrakech: United Nations.  
2002 "Las dos Caras de la Inmigración" in *Migraciones internas e intra-europeas en la Península Ibérica*. Santiago de Compostela: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Santiago.
- DIEZ-NICOLÁS, J. & M.J. RAMÍREZ-LAFITA  
2001a *La Inmigración en España: Una Década de Investigaciones*. Madrid: IMSERSO.  
2001b *La Voz de los Inmigrantes*. Madrid: IMSERSO.  
(forthcoming) *Las Dos Caras de la Inmigración*. Madrid: IMSERSO.
- DUNCAN, O.D.  
1964 "Social Organization and the Ecosystem" in: R.E.L. Faris (ed.), *Handbook of Modern Sociology*. Chicago: Rand Mc Nally and Co.
- FUKUYAMA, F.  
1991 *The End of History and Last Man*. New York: The Free Press.
- GIDDENS, A.  
2000 *Runaway World*. London & New York: Routledge.
- HALLER, M.  
2001 "Europe and the Arab-Islamic World. A Sociological Perspective on the Differences and Mutual (mis-) Perceptions between Two Neighbouring Culture Areas." Paper presented at the First International Conference on Social Sciences and the Development of Society, Kuwait University, Kuwait.
- HAWLEY, A.H.  
1986 *Human Ecology. A theoretical essay*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

- HÖFERT, A. & A. SALVATORE  
 2000 "Beyond the Clash of Civilizations: Transcultural Politics between Europe and Islam" in A. Höfert and A. Salvatore (eds), *Between Europe and Islam: Shaping Modernity in a Transcultural Space*. Frankfurt: Lang.
- HUNTINGTON, S.P.  
 1996 *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- HUTTON, W. & A. GIDDENS (EDS.)  
 2000 *Global Capitalism*. New York: New Press.
- INGLEHART, R.  
 1977 *The Silent Revolution*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.  
 1990 *Culture Shift*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. (Translated into Spanish (1992): *El Cambio Cultural*, Madrid: CIS, Introduction by J. Díez Nicolás).  
 1997 *Modernization and Postmodernization*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. (Translated into Spanish (1998): *Modernización y Postmodernización*, Madrid: CIS, Introduction by J. Díez Nicolás).  
 1999 "Postmodernization Erodes Respect for Authority, but Increases Support for Democracy" in P. Norris (ed.): *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 2001 "Public Support for Democratic Institutions: A Global Perspective," report prepared for Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE), Madrid.
- KAHN, H. AND J. WIENER  
 1967 *L'An 2000*. Paris: Laffont.
- LASSWELL, H.D.  
 1977 *Harold D. Lasswell on Political Sociology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- MARX, K.  
 1904 *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*. New York: International Library Publishing Co.
- MERRIT, R.L. & S. ROKKAN (EDS.)  
 1966 *Comparing Nations, The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross — National Research*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- NORRIS, P. & R. INGLEHART  
 2002 "Islamic Culture and Democracy: Testing the Clash of Civilizations Thesis." *Comparative Sociology* 1(3): 235-263.
- PARETO, V.  
 1921 *Transformazione della Democrazia*. Corbaccio: Milano.
- SHEARMUR, J.  
 1996 *Political Thought of Karl Popper*. London & New York: Routledge.
- DEL VALLE, A.  
 2000 *Guerres contre l'Europe*. Paris: Editions des Syrtes.
- UNITED NATIONS  
 1987 *Our Common Future*. UN Commission on Environment and Development, New York.  
 2002 *The Human Development Report*. New York: PNUD, UN.
- WEBER, M.  
 1946 *The Theory of Economic and Social Organization*. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.